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TREATY INTERPRETATION: THE
AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE
COMMUNITIES
Ian Johnstone*
INTRODUCTION
Among the various sources of international law, treaties are gener-
ally regarded as resting on the firmest theoretical foundation.I The
existence of a binding commitment expressly assented to and formal-
ized in a signed document does not seem problematic within a con-
sent-based theory of law. Yet, even a casual glance at the debate
among legal and literary scholars concerning the stability of meaning
and the creative role of the interpreter undermines this comforting pic-
ture of international conventional law.2 The defining issue in both
legal and literary interpretation can be characterized as. follows: to
what extent does the text have a determinate meaning, and to what
extent is the reader free to interpret it as he or she chooses? 3 This
question is especially relevant to treaty interpretation where, more
often than not, the contracting parties themselves have the final say
about the meaning of particular provisions of the agreement in ques-
* B.A., LL.B, University of Toronto; LL.M., Columbia University. Mr. Johnstone is cur-
rently a Warren Weaver Fellow in the Rockefeller Foundation's International Security Program
and a former Associate in Law at Columbia University School of Law. Mr. Johnstone thanks
Oscar Schachter, Stanley Fish, Kent Greenawalt and Richard Thomas for their invaluable com-
ments on earlier drafts of this article.
1. The Statute of the International Court of Justice, article 38(1), lists the following sources
of international law:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly rec-
ognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. . . . judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), 15 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 355, 360 (1945).
2. For a good sample of the various points of view, see the series of articles emerging from a
symposium on law and interpretation published in 60 TEX. L. REV. (1982). See also Fiss, Objec-
tivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982); Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325
(1984).
3. The theoretical extremes can be elaborated along the following lines: on one side is the
belief in the determinacy of meaning in the text and in the validity of interpreting the text's
linguistic elements; on the other side is the contention that each reader determines his or her own
meaning without objective linguistic or contextual limitations. The middle ground is occupied by
a variety of positions and methodological approaches. See Abraham, Statutory Interpretation and
Literary Theory: Some Common Concerns of an Unlikely Pair, in INTERPRETING LAW AND
LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC READER 115, 116-17 (S. Levinson & S. Mailloux eds. 1988).
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tion (a phenomenon that can be labelled "auto-interpretation"). Be-
cause many international instruments do not provide for the
submission of disputes to impartial tribunals, interpretation is a re-
sponsibility of domestic officials who are institutionally predisposed to
interpretations preferred by their State and government.
Skepticism about the determinacy of meaning combined with the
absence of an impartial interpreter can lead to the discomforting con-
clusion that treaty auto-interpretation is an unconstrained activity de-
termined entirely by short-term national interests and power politics.
In this article, I seek to counter that perception by positing the exist-
ence of a structure of constraints embedded in the process of treaty
interpretation despite the absence of a disinterested interpreter. Inter-
pretive authority, it will be argued, resides in neither the text nor the
reader individually, but with the community of professionals engaged
in the enterprise of treaty interpretation and implementation. This
"interpretive community" is defined and constituted by a set of con-
ventions and institutional practices that structure the interpretive
process.
My purpose here is not to compare or evaluate interpretive tech-
niques and strategies.4 Rather, Part I of this paper sets out a theory of
interpretation (drawing on Stanley Fish's idea of interpretive commu-
nities) relevant to all interpretive techniques. In Part II, a conception
of the purposes and conventions of treaty practice is offered with the
aim of shedding light on the interpretive constraints structuring that
enterprise. Part III identifies two interpretive communities associated
with treaty practice (one narrow, the other broad) and describes their
operation in the interpretive process. Special attention is paid to the
government legal advisor, who plays a key role within the relevant
interpretive communities. Part IV is a case study of the ABM Treaty
reinterpretation debate ignited by the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative;
this debate is chosen because the treaty's "political" character5 renders
it typical of international instruments not likely to be submitted to
4. Interpretive methods or strategies can be classified roughly into four categories: textual,
contextual, subjective and teleological. See Jacobs, Varieties of Approach to Treaty Interpretation:
With Special Reference to the Draft Convention on the Law of the Treaties Before the Vienna
Diplomatic Conference, 18 INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 318 (1969). See also A. MCNAIR, THE LAW OF
TREATIES (1961). For a recent overview of the various approaches to the interpretation of inter-
national agreements, see E. YAMBRUSIC, TREATY INTERPRETATION: THEORY AND REALITY
(1987). For the most influential American contribution to the literature, see M. McDOUGAL, H.
LASSWELL & J. MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC OR-
DER: PRINCIPLES OF CONTENT AND PROCEDURE (1967) [hereinafter M. McDOUGAL ET AL.].
5. See L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 80 (2d ed. 1979),
where he singles out laws and treaties involving "international peace and stability, or the secur-
ity, integrity, and independence of nations" as the agreements that "the student of foreign affairs
may have in mind when he asserts that international law is widely disregarded."
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impartial tribunals for authoritative interpretation. My aim is not to
enter the debate but to assess it in light of the notion that interpretive
communities are the ultimate source of authority. The final part of the
article consists of a brief discussion of interpretive disputes over the
Non-Proliferation Treaty and the United Nations Charter, illustrating
how the theory applies to multilateral and constitutional instruments
as well as bilateral treaties. These less fully-developed case studies are
offered in support of the proposition that, while the interpretive pro-
cess is apt to be more diffuse with respect to norms embodied in more
general instruments, the authority of interpretive communities is no
less significant.
I. INTERPRETATION THEORY
The suggestion that treaty interpretation is a subjective process is
not radical in the study of international relations since it is consistent
with political realist theory.6 However, as a matter of legal theory, the
position is associated with what one writer has described as the nihilist
challenge to law. 7 This theory of legal interpretation emphasizes the
creative role of the interpreter and denies that objectivity is possible
given the ambiguous nature of words and their imperfection as modes
of communicating meaning. It is the polar opposite of the "textualist"
approach, according to which language is determinate, and meaning
can be discovered and extracted from a text by a reader who employs
the correct process.
Whatever its merits as a theory of interpretation in domestic set-
tings, the "textualist" approach is particularly implausible in the inter-
national context. Language is a communal institution, and shared
6. Political realism is a theory of international relations that sees world politics as determined
entirely by the power relations of sovereign States. The creation and decline of international
rules and institutions, and the degree to which States respect them, depend solely on existing
power alignments. A contrasting body of theory, which has come to prominence quite recently,
does not deny the importance of power but emphasizes the impact of interdependence and posits
the existence of regimes (the most formal of which is law) as mediating the effect of power on
interstate relations. For the classic modern articulation of political realism, see H. MORGEN-
THAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE (4th ed. 1967).
The seminal work on interdependence is R. KEOHANE AND J. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPEN-
DENCE: WORLD POLITICS IN TRANSITION (1977). The best collection on regimes is a series of
articles published in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (S. Krasner ed. 1983). For a recent overview of
international relations theory, see Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus
for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335 (1989).
7. Fiss, supra note 2, at 740-44. Fiss describes the nihilist challenge as follows: "The nihilist
would argue that for any text.., there are any number of possible meanings, that interpretation
consists of choosing one of those meanings, and that in this selection process the judge will
inevitably express his own values, All law is masked power." Id. at 741. The contrasting per-
spectives in international relations scholarship parallel their opposites in domestic legal theory,
where the traditional view of law as neutral and determinate is challenged by those who claim it
is all politics and masked power.
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understandings are dependent on a common language and culture be-
tween speaker and listener.8 In the notoriously heterogeneous interna-
tional system, treaties are typically concluded by States with different
cultures and, often, different languages. Thus, the notion that the in-
terpreter's task is merely to construe the words of the instrument, with
little recourse to context or extrinsic evidence, has been largely
discredited. 9
Rejection of textualism would seem to suggest that contextualism
is the key to interpretation. The methodology employed by McDou-
gal, Lasswell and Miller, described in the following passage, is essen-
tially contextualist: "[t]he communications which constitute an
international agreement, like all other communications, are functions
of a larger context, and the realistic identification of the content of
these communications must require a systematic, comprehensive ex-
amination of all the relevant features of that context, with conscious
and deliberate appraisal of their significance." 10 While more sophisti-
cated, this method does not settle the deeper theoretical questions con-
cerning interpretation. Instead, it transfers the inquiry to another
level: how the relevant contexts are identified and how such contextu-
alist reading takes place. "
In discussing domestic adjudication, Owen Fiss provides one an-
swer, borrowing the idea of interpretive communities from literary
theorists.' 2 The term does not lend itself to easy definition and is best
understood as a way of speaking about the power of institutional set-
tings, within which assumptions and beliefs count as established
facts. 13 In responding to what he calls the nihilist challenge to law,
Fiss posits a theory of "bounded objectivity," whereby legal interpre-
tation is constrained by a set of disciplining rules recognized as au-
thoritative by an interpretive community. The objective quality of
interpretation is bounded because the constraints are not transcendent,
not imposed by some "brooding omnipresence in the sky," but rather
consist of the set of rules that are accepted as being authoritative for a
given institution. Fiss focuses on adjudication and identifies judges as
8. K. Greenawalt, Objectivity and Law 5-11 (unpublished manuscript). See also id. at 2-7.
9. In the international sphere, textualism is associated with Vattel's antiquated injunction:
"It is not permissible to interpret what has no need of interpretation." See Falk, On Treaty
Interpretation and the New Haven Approach: Achievements and Prospects, 8 VA. J. INT'L L. 323,
333 (1968); Jacobs, supra note 4, at 322.
10. M. McDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 4, at 11.
11. Levinson & Mailloux, Forward to INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 3,
at xii.
12. The term "interpretive community" was coined by Stanley Fish. See S. FISH, Is THERE
A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES (1980).
13. Abraham, supra note 3, at 122.
[Vol. 12:371
Treaty Interpretation
the relevant interpretive community. 14
The Fiss argument has been criticized as a theory of judicial inter-
pretation.' 5 For present purposes it is sufficient to note that, on its
own terms, the argument has limited application to the process of
treaty auto-interpretation. Fiss emphasizes that the interpretive com-
munity of judges has authority to confer on particular interpretations
because judges belong to the community, not as a result of shared
views, but "by virtue of their office," which carries with it "a commit-
ment to uphold and advance the rule of law itself."1 6 Thus, the claim
of authority is extrinsic to the process of interpretation, which, in Fiss'
view, is what distinguishes the judge from the literary critic or moral
philosopher who must rely on intellectual authority alone. t7 This neat
division between the process of interpretation and the authority of the
interpreter cannot be sustained in the context of treaty auto-interpreta-
tion. The entities responsible for interpretation are the parties to the
treaty; they do not occupy a position from which authoritative inter-
pretations can be issued simply by virtue of the office.
The problem of authoritative decision-making in international so-
ciety relates, then, to its decentralized character. This decentralization
is symbolized by the absence of an international tribunal for resolving
all interpretive disputes, but the problem is not merely institutional.
Because an international tribunal cannot fully reflect the value diversi-
ties of all States subject to it, it can never receive the degree of accept-
ance and confidence bestowed on domestic courts.' 8 However, this
weakness of international adjudication does not render international
law meaningless; it merely highlights its communicative function. As
a form of social communication, law shapes State behavior by expres-
14. Among the disciplining rules he specifies are judicial independence, the concept of non-
discretionary jurisdiction, and the duty to base decisions on universalizable grounds. Fiss, supra
note 2, at 754.
15. One of Fiss' most forceful critics is Stanley Fish, from whom he borrowed the idea of
interpretive communities. See Fish, supra note 2. See also Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX.
L. REV. 373, 401 (1982); Brest, Interpretation and Interest: Comment on Fiss, 34 STAN. L. REV.
765 (1982).
16. Fiss, supra note 2, at 746.
17. Id. at 757.
18. As Julius Stone states:
[W]e still lack international tribunals which can reflect the socio-ethical convictions of the
aggregate of States, in a manner corresponding to that in which municipal judges reflect the
convictions of a nation. And it is this relation between judges and community which, in the
final resort, renders judicial law-creation tolerable and consistent with liberty.
Stone, Fictional Elements in Treaty Interpretation-A Study in the International Judicial Process,
1 SYDNEY L. REV. 344, 364 (1954). Along similar lines, Falk argues that "the authoritativeness
of an interpretation derives, in part, from the cohesiveness of the elite creating an aura of objec-
tivity for its interpretative claims and, thereby, soliciting voluntary acquiescence from the general
public." Falk, supra note 9, at 326.
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sing and developing a "climate of opinion" about the nature of trans-
national relationships.1 9 Law structures the relations among States by
providing a common frame of reference. It is the language of interna-
tional society: to present one's claims in legal terms means to signal
which norms one considers relevant and to indicate which procedures
one intends to follow and would like others to follow. 20 As Hedley
Bull states:
[I]nternational law provides a means by which states can advertise their
intentions with regard to the matter in question; provide one another
with reassurance about their future policies in relation to it; specify pre-
cisely what the nature of the agreement is, including its boundaries and
limiting conditions; and solemnise the agreement in such a way as to
create an expectation of permanence. 21
The interpreter of a treaty has a special role that a literary critic
does not, but it is worth exploring the theory of interpretive communi-
ties as it has emerged from literary criticism since both disciplines are
characterized by the absence of a central organ authorized to render
final interpretations. Stanley Fish has developed a "conventional" the-
ory of interpretation which seeks to avoid the pitfalls of both pure
subjectivity and pure objectivity. He never defines the concept of an
interpretive community but rather explains it in terms of its function
in interpretive practice. The following passage provides one of his
more detailed explanations and is worth quoting at length:
The notion of 'interpretive communities' was originally introduced as an
answer to a question that had long seemed crucial to literary studies.
What is the source of interpretive authority: the text or the reader?
Those who answered 'the text' were embarrassed by the fact of disagree-
ment. Why, if the text contains its own meaning and constrains its own
interpretation, do so many interpreters disagree about that meaning?
Those who answered 'the reader' were embarrassed by the fact of agree-
ment. Why, if meaning is created by the individual reader from the per-
spective of his own experience and interpretive desires, is there so much
that interpreters agree about? What was required was an explanation
that could account for both agreement and disagreement and that expla-
nation was found in the idea of an interpretive community, not so much
19. W. COPLIN, THE FUNCTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 168-95 (1966). See also F.
KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS AND DECISIONS 251 (1989); Falk, supra note 9, at 327.
20. Hoffman, Introduction to INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLITICAL CRISIS at xii (L. Schein-
man & D. Wilkinson eds. 1968). As McDougal, Lasswell and Miller put it, "[e]very type of
prescription or agreement ... is a communication in which parties seek through signs and deeds
to mediate their subjectivities. " M. McDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 4, at xi. Law, by increasing
the ability of States to communicate, "adds to the common grammar of statecraft." Keohane &
Nye, Power and Interdependence Revisited, 41 INT'L ORG. 725, 746 (1987). On the significance of
communication to regime building and regime maintenance generally, see Keohane, The De-
mand for International Regimes, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, supra note 6, at 141, 164.
21. H. BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY 142 (1977).
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a group of individuals who shared a point of view, but a point of view or
way of organizing experience that shared individuals in the sense that its
assumed distinctions, categories of understanding, and stipulations of
relevance and irrelevance were the content of the consciousness of com-
munity members who were therefore no longer individuals, but, in so far
as they were embedded in the community's enterprise, community prop-
erty. It followed that such community-constituted interpreters would, in
their turn, constitute, more or less in agreement, the same text, although
the sameness would not be attributable to the self-identity of the text, but
to the communal nature of the interpretive act. Of course, if the same
act were performed by members of another community - of some rival
school of criticism informed by wholly different assumptions - the re-
sulting text would be different, and there would be disagreement; not,
however, a disagreement that could be settled by the text because what
would be in dispute would be the interpretive 'angle' from which the text
was to be seen, and in being seen, made.
22
Fish argues that Fiss' disciplining rules cannot serve as objective
constraints on interpretation because they are in need of interpretation
themselves. 23 However, Fish does not see this as cause for despair:
there is no need for external constraints on interpretation because the
interpreter is already constrained by the "assumptions and categories
of understanding" that are embedded in the practice in which he or
she has been trained and participates. 24 The interpreter is "not only
possessed of but possessed by ... a tacit knowledge that tells him not
so much what to do, but already has him doing it as a condition of
perception and even of thought."' 25 Thus, the disinterestedness the
reader may feel in interpreting a text is the result of membership in a
community whose beliefs have become matters of common sense, in
the words of Kenneth Abraham, "so indisputable that their role in
constituting the very objects of understanding goes unrecognized." 26
The idea of internal constraints put forward by Fish need not be
understood as suggesting it is intellectually impossible for a member of
a given interpretive community to arrive at an interpretation divergent
from the categories and assumptions of that community. Rather, di-
22. S. FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY 141-42 (1989).
23. Fish, supra note 2, at 1326.
24. Id. at 1333. "[Wlhereas Fiss thinks that.readers and texts are in need of constraints, I
would say that they are structures of constraint, at once components of and agents in the larger
structure of a field of practices, practices that are the content of whatever 'rules' one might
identify as belonging to the enterprise." Id. at 1339. Falk makes a similar point when he states
that "the style of persuasion is conditioned by the value expectations that dominate the commu-
nity and are presumably represented in those chosen to interpret-positions of honor and sub-
stance-who are thoroughly socialized by the community that they serve and represent." Falk,
supra note 9, at 326.
25. Fish, supra note 2, at 1333.
26. Abraham, supra note 3, at 122.
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vergence from the conventions and practices of the relevant interpre-
tive community signifies that the interpreter has taken himself or
herself out of it altogether. All professional interpreters are situated
within an institutional context, and interpretive activity only makes
sense in terms of the purposes of the enterprise in which the inter-
preter is participating, whether it be literary criticism, religious inter-
pretation or legal interpretation. Furthermore, a given text is always
encountered in a situation or field of practice and therefore can only be
understood in light of the position it occupies in that enterprise. Ac-
cording to Fish, texts do not have properties before they are encoun-
tered in situations; the meanings they have are always a function of the
circumstances in which they are encountered. 27 Thus, interpretation
is constrained not by the language of the text, nor its context, but by
the "cultural assumptions within which both texts and contexts take
shape for situated agents."' 28 The text is not an object entirely in-
dependent of its reader, nor is interpretation an entirely individual and
subjective activity; meaning is produced by neither the text nor the
reader but by the interpretive community in which both are situated.
The idea of interpretive communities runs counter to the view that
meaning is radically indeterminate. The meaning of a word or set of
words is always either clear or capable of being clarified because com-
munication occurs within situations and "to be in a situation is already
to be in possession of (or to be possessed by) a structure of assump-
tions, of practices understood to be relevant in relation to purposes
and goals that are already in place .... "29 Rational discourse about
competing interpretations within an enterprise is possible as long as
there is an understanding, largely tacit, of the enterprise's general pur-
pose.30 Disputes between interpreters are resolvable, not according to
rules of interpretation in Fiss' sense, but by the "conventions of de-
scription, argument, judgment, and persuasion as they operate in this
or that profession or discipline or community." '31
The practices and conventions of a given community constrain in-
terpretive discretion, although the constraint is not an "objective" or
external force. 32 The art of persuading another to accept a particular
27. Fish, supra note 2, at 1335.
28. S. FIsH, supra note 22, at 300.
29. S. FIsH, supra note 12, at 318.
30. Fish, supra note 2, at 1343.
31. S. FISH, supra note 22, at 116.
32. As Fish states:
An interpretive community is not objective because as a bundle of interests, of particular
purposes and goals, its perspective is interested rather than neutral; but by the very same
reasoning, the meanings and texts produced by an interpretive community are not subjective
[Vol. 12:371
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reading of a text does not entail demonstrating its "true meaning," but
rather convincing the person that, in effect, he or she belongs to the
same community of interpretation. 3  The process, however, need not
be conscious. Rather, the interpretive techniques employed, substan-
tive arguments made and underlying assumptions relied upon are all
characteristic of a certain interpretive community. If the listener is
persuaded, it is not because the truth of the interpretation has been
demonstrated (although both people may perceive it that way), but
because the listener and speaker have settled on certain common be-
liefs and categories of understanding, and therefore have become
members of the same interpretive community. As Abraham states,
these common beliefs are, for that community, "facts," which are not
immutable but provide objectivity within a community of interpreta-
tion where they need not be questioned.3 4
The professional interpreter is a participant in a particular field of
practice and is engaged in interpretive activity that must be persuasive
to others. In that capacity, he or she acts as an extension of an institu-
tional community; failure to act in that way would be stigmatized as
inconsistent with the conventions and purposes of that community. In
other words, if the interpreter proffers an interpretation that reaches
beyond the range of responses dictated by the conventions of the enter-
prise, he or she ceases to act as a member of the relevant community.
A troubling feature of Fish's theory is that the strength of the con-
straint on any interpreter seems to depend on the extent to which the
interpretive community is unified. Ronald Dworkin argues that the
constraint imposed by the practices of the professional literary com-
because they do not proceed from an isolated individual but from a public and conventional
point of view.
S. FISH, supra note 12, at 14.
33. Abraham, supra note 3, at 124. The way in which people change their minds is not
straightforward in the theory of interpretive communities because, if consciousness is informed
by community assumptions, it is not clear how appeals from outside the community can have an
impact on consciousness. Furthermore, appeals from within the community would never be
necessary because presumably members who share assumptions and categories of understanding
would interpret a text the same way. Fish responds by pointing out that it is misleading to think
of change as a process by which something from the outside penetrates the inside of a conscious-
ness or community:
Even though the mind is informed by assumptions that limit what it can even notice, among
those is the assumption that one's assumptions are subject to challenge and possible revision
under certain circumstances and according to certain procedures when they are set in mo-
tion by certain persons. What this means is that the mind is not a static structure, but an
assemblage of related beliefs any one of which can exert pressure on any other in a motion
that can lead to self-transformation. In short ... rather than being an object of which one
might ask, 'how does it change,' the mind (and by extension the [interpretive] community) is
an engine of change.
S. FISH, supra note 22, at 146.
34. Id. at 124.
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munity are so weak that, despite Fish's protests to the contrary, inter-
pretation is effectively rendered "wholly subjective" by his theory.35 It
is not necessary for present purposes to assess the force of this criti-
cism as it pertains to literary interpretive communities. The argument
being made here is that treaty practice is a distinctly legal enterprise
characterized by the absence of an overarching authority to settle dif-
ferences of interpretation, but which nevertheless exhibits certain in-
terpretive constraints that inhere in the conventions of the enterprise.
II. TREATY PRACTICE AND INTERPRETATION
If interpretive activity is enterprise-specific, then to understand the
constraints on treaty interpretation one must have some conception of
the distinctive purposes and conventions of that enterprise. 36 Not all
treaties and international agreements are the same: interpretive prac-
tices vary with the subject matter, the number of contracting parties
and the context in which the treaty is made and implemented. Never-
theless, certain generalizations can be made about the nature of the
enterprise that apply, in varying degrees, to all international
agreements.
Of primary importance is the notion that treaties, unlike works of
literature, embody a commitment to a distinctive process of interpreta-
tion. This commitment is rooted in the fact that a treaty is the prod-
uct of the consensual activity of two or more States, and its terms
embody the collective expectations and interests of the parties. Be-
cause the parties to the treaty comprise the collective norm-creating
body, the competence of authoritative interpretation is vested in the
composite organ they form rather than either of them individually. 37
If the treaty does not provide for a dispute resolution procedure, then
an authoritative interpretation can only result from a process that em-
bodies this notion of the parties as a composite law-making entity in
some other way. In entering into a treaty, a State binds itself not only
35. Dworkin, My Reply to Stanley Fish, in THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION 287, 294 (W.
Mitchell ed. 1982). See also R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 425 n.23 (1986); Brest, supra note 15,
at 770.
36. Obviously not everyone has the same conception of the enterprise, but it is not necessary
that they do for the theory of interpretive communities to have explanatory power. The crucial
point is that arguments about the adequacy of various interpretations are, at their root, argu-
ments about competing conceptions of the enterprise. Furthermore, these arguments are them-
selves constrained, not by objective factors, but by the conventions within which this level of
discourse takes place. Ultimately, the accuracy of a given conception cannot be "demonstrated";
the most one can hope to do is persuade an audience to a point of view on the nature of the
enterprise. See S. FISH, supra note 12, at 368, for a discussion of this point as it pertains to the
enterprise of literary criticism and theory.
37. Gross, States as Organs of International Law and the Problem of Autointerpretation, in
LAW AND POLITICS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 59, 81 (G. Lipsky ed. 1953).
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to the terms of the instrument (however interpreted) but also to a pro-
cess of intersubjective interpretation: the interpretive task is to ascer-
tain what the text means to the parties collectively rather than to each
individually. 38 , The activities and perspectives of the interpretive com-
munities associated with this enterprise render treaty auto-interpreta-
tion something other than the exercise of unilateral political will.
The interpretive process, then, must be understood as part of an
ongoing relationship in which the parties generate, elaborate and re-
fine shared understandings and expectations. McDougal, Lasswell
and Miller describe the aim of interpretation as follows:
It is to discover the shared expectations that the parties to the relevant
communication succeeded in creating in each other. It would be an act
of distortion on behalf of one-party against another to ascertain and to
give effect to his version of a supposed agreement if investigation shows
that the expectations of this party were not matched by the expectations
of the other.39
The authors were mainly concerned with articulating a theory of
interpretation that international tribunals could adopt in interpreting
treaties, and it must be refined in the context of auto-interpretation.
The argument being presented in this article is that, in entering into a
treaty, the parties assent not only to the terms of the agreement but
also to a process of interpretation whose goal is an intersubjective un-
derstanding of the treaty terms. In Fish's terminology, the parties cre-
ate an "interpretive community." The interpretive task is to "uncover
together" the meaning of the treaty; while auto-interpretation is car-
ried on by individual participants, the process is essentially interac-
tive. 4° Intersubjective interpretation is not simply a matter of finding
38. It must be emphasized that the theory of interpretive communities does not depend on
particular conceptions of the various enterprises in which interpretation occurs. Interpretive
communities constrain social practices however conceived. Thus, in the context of treaty inter-
pretation, the theory does not derive its explanatory power from the conception of treaty practice
herein advanced, although the centrality of the norm of reciprocity to international relations does
render the theory particularly apposite to this interpretive activity. See infra note 43.
39. M. McDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 4, at xvi. A more controversial aspect of the authors'
suggested strategy urges recourse to the "basic constitutive policies of the larger community
which embraces both parties and decision-maker," whenever the search for genuine shared ex-
pectations "must falter or fail because of gaps, contradictions, or ambiguities in the parties' com-
munication." In addition, the authors argue that to protect "overriding common interests...
decision-makers should refuse to give effect to the expectations of the parties .. .when grave
contradictions are found between the explicit expectations of parties to an agreement and the
requirements of fundamental community policy." Id. at 41. Thus, as Richard Falk points out,
the interpretive theory of the New Haven school ultimately subordinates the genuine expecta-
tions of the parties to the basic norms of world legal order. Falk, supra note 9, at 338. How
great one views this departure as being from a pure "shared expectations" approach depends on
one's view of the depth and breadth of consensus on the existence and ordering of world commu-
nity policies.
40. See Postema, 'Protestant' Interpretation and Social Practices, 6 LAW & PHIL. 283, 308
(1987), where he makes this point about all interpretive activity.
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the points of agreement between the parties; it is to engage in a "col-
lectively meaningful activity, in an activity collectively understood. '41
The parties can be viewed as having implicitly agreed to a process
of intersubjective interpretation because, while they expect disagree-
ment over the meaning of terms, they do not expect every disagree-
ment to signify a desire on the part of one or the other to revoke the
treaty or terminate the relationship embodied in it. States comply
with treaties primarily because they have an interest in reciprocal
compliance by the other party or parties.42 Reciprocity is particularly
important to security-related agreements because the parties' mutual
interest in preserving them extends beyond the perceived advantages
of the treaties themselves. Security relations in the nuclear age thrust
every nation into a continuing relationship with every other nation, a
relationship that outlives particular agreements. 43 Thus, decision-
makers in each State are conscious of the effects of their immediate
actions on future relations. Arms control treaties and other security-
related arrangements are important events in the overall relationship,
but not the complete embodiment of it. It is precisely because they are
situated within a broader relationship that such agreements exist and
are complied with even in the absence of enforcement mechanisms.
To understand what it means to say that interpretation entails a
good faith effort by each side to arrive at an understanding of what the
treaty means to the parties collectively, an analogy can be drawn to
friendship. In an article on social practices in general, Gerald Pos-
41. Id. at 288.
42. As McDougal, Lasswell and Miller state: "What restraint there is upon arbitrary deci-
sion, and it is not insignificant, is afforded by the same sanction which supports all international
law: common interest, policed by need for reciprocity and fear of retaliation." M. McDoUGAL
ET AL., supra note 4, at 28. See also H. BULL, supra note 21, at 139; R. BILDER, MANAGING THE
RISKS OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT 8 (1981).
43. R. BILDER, supra note 42, at 11. The broader relationship between parties to treaties is
what permits order in the international system, and it rests on the norm of reciprocity. As David
Hume theorized, conventions, arising out of interactions that prove mutually beneficial, structure
expectations and make international agreements possible, even in the absence of an enforcement
mechanism:
This convention is not of the nature of a promise .... It is only a general sense of common
interest.... When this common sense of interest is mutually expressed and known to both,
it produces a suitable resolution and behavior. And this may properly enough be called a
convention or agreement betwixt us though without the interposition of a promise, since the
actions of each of us have a reference to those of the other and are performed upon the
supposition that something is to be performed on the other part .... [I]t is only on the
expectation of this that our moderation and abstinence are founded. In like manner are
languages gradually established by human convention, without any promise.
F. KRATOCHWIL, INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND FOREIGN POLICY 17 (1978) (quoting Hume).
See R. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984), for a detailed and fascinating
study of reciprocity as the source of international cooperation. Much of the writing on regimes
focuses on the role of conventionalized behavior in generating recognized norms, principles and
procedures. See, e.g., Young, Regime Dynamics.- The Rise and Fall of International Regimes, in
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, supra note 6, at 93-96.
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tema characterizes friendship as an interpretive concept and offers this
explanation of the interpretive activity:
[T]he focus of 'interpretive' attention in our friendship would not be on
what our culture means by friendship, but what our friendship, our rela-
tionship, means or requires. That is, the 'interpretation' would focus on
the dynamics, the history, and the developments of this specific relation-
ship, not on the abstract concept of friendship, or the general practice of
friendship in the culture (if there is such a thing). Moreover, friends
would seek an understanding of what this specific relationship has come
to mean, as they would say, to us - not to each of us individually (us in
sensu diviso), but to us together (in sensu composito). The history of the
friendship is a common history, and the complex meaning of the rela-
tionship is collectively constructed over the course of this history. When
friends share a common history, Aristotle points out, it is not like cows
sharing a pasture, for the shared life of friends engenders common per-
ception, a common perspective, and common discourse. Friendship is
characterized, ultimately, not by sympathy or consensus (homonoia), but
by common deliberation and thought .... [A] friend's understanding of
the relationship could only be achieved through interaction with the
other.... To regard the meaning of that relationship as the private inter-
pretive construct of one or the other, or some ideal limit of such constructs,
fails to recognize the common perspective and discourse which structures
the relationship.44
The analogy is not perfect because friendships entail trust, while
relationships between signatories to international agreements do not
necessarily. Nevertheless, the idea of a relationship whose meaning is
constructed "collectively" over time and which is characterized by
common perceptions, perspectives and deliberation brings out an im-
portant feature of the relations between parties to such agreements.
While the parties may disagree about the meaning of the terms of the
treaty, the treaty remains in force as long as there is sufficient impetus
for preserving the relationship. 45 Treaty interpretation occurs within
the framework of an explicitly consensual relationship, terminable at
the instigation of either party. Yet, as long as the relationship embod-
ied in the treaty continues to exist, the parties are engaged in an enter-
prise that shapes the spirit in which interpretations are constructed
44. Postema, supra note 40, at 309-10 (emphasis added).
45. Treaties are more like relations than transaction contracts, a distinction drawn by some
contract theorists. Many contracts are not one-time transactions but rather long-term relation-
ships, like many employment contracts, where the parties seek not only to fix specific terms but
also to structure their relationships in mutually benficial ways. As Patrick Atiyah points out:
[The] obligations and rights of the parties are constantly modified and adapted as time goes
on, and what is more, many of these modifications are less the result of day-to-day adjust-
ments which are in some vague way acquiesced in by the parties .... A concept of 'good
faith' or of the fidelity to the relationship becomes important. Dispute-settlement proce-
dures may come to be needed which are not so adversary as those involved in litigation,
because parties may want to settle an argument amicably, while continuing their relations.
P. ATIYAH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 55-56 (4th ed. 1989).
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and debated.46 Conversely, the relationship exists as long as the par-
ties continue to engage in the form of interpretive activity consistent
with the conventions and purposes of the enterprise. The relationship
or community is, in part, the interpretive process. The interpretive
process is one in which the understandings of each participant must be
addressed to other participants and sensitive to their understandings,
with the shared goal of maintaining the relationship. 47 Meaning is not
simply the product of explicit agreement between the States at the mo-
ment of interpretation (although interpretive disputes can be settled or
made to go away by explicit agreement), but the interpretive process is
shaped and thereby constrained by the conventions and practices of an
enterprise characterized by reciprocity.4
At a certain point, however, disagreement over the meaning of
terms rises to an altogether different level where the treaty itself is
threatened. In Postema's view, this level of disagreement puts "the
identity and integrity of the community and its commitments ... at
stake. '' 49 A treaty ceases to exist as a normative instrument when con-
sent is withdrawn. Consent is withdrawn in one of two ways: 1) by
explicit withdrawal from, or abrogation of, the treaty; 50 or 2) by im-
46. This point is made by Postema in reference to interpretive activity within all social prac-
tices, which, he argues, depends on a substantial degree of consensus but does not depend on
agreement in individual beliefs:
This consensus does not obviate the need for interpretations, nor does it guarantee univocal-
ity of the interpretations. But it does decisively shape the spirit in which interpretations are
constructed and debated. Controversy, then, is possible, even at what we might call the
'constitutional' level of the practice, without jeopardizing the practice as a whole (and it
may even be healthy for it). It is possible because there is a deeper and broader continuity of
experience and discipline. Where this continuity is threatened or weakened, there the prac-
tice itself is threatened.
Postema, supra note 40, at 319.
47. Id. at 304. See also Fish, supra note 2, at 1332.
48. The idea of interpretive communities does not have any specific implications for the prac-
tice of interpretation. All interpretive methods are consistent with the idea, and it certainly does
not imply that describing a particular interpretation as being "right" or "wrong" is nonsensical.
Believing that one interpretation is better than another is a pre-condition of interpretive activity.
The interpreter's self-assurance is not undercut by the theory of interpretive communities be-
cause doubt on that level is not possible. As explained by Fish:
Doubting, like any other mental activity is something that one does within a set of assump-
tions that cannot at the same time be the object of doubt .... The project of radical doubt
can never outrun the necessity of being situated; in order to doubt everything, including the
ground one stands on, one must stand somewhere else, and that somewhere else will then be
the ground on which one stands.
S. FiSH, supra note 12, at 360.
49. Postema, supra note 40, at 317.
50. The consequences of treaty termination vary depending on the terms of the particular
treaty. All bilateral and multilateral arms control agreements contain a "withdrawal clause,"
which appeared for the first time in the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963. Article IV of that treaty
is typical:
Each party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the
treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this treaty, have
jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.
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plicit abrogation in the form of a persistently forwarded "unconven-
tional" construction of the treaty. An unconventional construction is
one that is inconsistent with the purposes, understandings and under-
lying assumptions of the enterprise. When a party puts forward an
interpretation that is obviously "wrong," it is recognized -as such be-
cause it cannot be reconciled with the conventions and practices of the
interpretive communities associated with the enterprise. In light of
the conception of treaty practice presented above, it is submitted that
sustained insistence on such an interpretation reflects a disregard for
the intersubjective nature of the process and is symptomatic of a
breakdown in the relationship or a dissolution of the community. In-
sistence on extreme constructions deviates from accepted treaty prac-
tice and reflects inappropriate behavior by the interpreter given his or
her institutional role. The interpreter, in other words, steps out of the
interpretive community associated with the treaty and takes on some
other role.
III. THE INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES OF TREATY PRACTICE
In understanding how treaty auto-interpretation is constrained,
two interpretive communities can be identified: the community of in-
terpreters directly responsible for the conclusion and implementation
of a particular' treaty, and a broader, international community consist-
ing of all experts and officials engaged in the various professional ac-
tivities associated with treaty practice. The 'conventions and
institutional practices of both interpretive communities have a con-
straining effect, although the contribution of the latter is derivative in
that its authority can be traced to the implicit agreement between the
parties to engage in intersubjective interpretation.
A. The Narrow Interpretive Community
The exercise of formulating, negotiating, ratifying, and implement-
ing a treaty generates an interpretive community of individuals within
each contracting party who share what Fish calls "assumed distinc-
tions, categories of understanding, and stipulations of relevance and
irrelevance.""1 That is, the process of producing and living under a
treaty generates a community (not out of whole cloth but out of al-
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water,
Aug. 5, 1963, art. IV, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 1319, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, at 7, 480 U.N.T.S. 43, 49. This
clause, while it purports to grant a unilateral right of withdrawal, is subject to interpretation and
therefore raises the same interpretive'questions as any other treaty term. Is the process entirely
unconstrained, or are there features of the enterprise of making and withdrawing from treaties
that mitigate the apparent subjectivity of the exercise? See infra note 60.
51. S. FISH, supra note 22, at 141.
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ready existing communities with an elaborate web of relationships to
the new community) of people and institutions associated with the
treaty. These people are the officials within each State (from the
leader down) who have or had responsibility for any of the various
steps involved in producing the treaty.
The constraining effect of this narrow interpretive community is
felt, in part, through the expectations and beliefs controlled by the
agreement. 52 In the period prior to the making of an agreement, some
sort of relationship exists (or the agreement would not have been pos-
sible) that generates a body of knowledge shared by the parties.53 Offi-
cials within each State learn about the others' interests, values and
assumptions, as well as their perspectives on the various components
of the relationship. An agreement "crystallizes the learning of a par-
ticular period" 54 and the contacts made help spread common under-
standings about the precise terms of the agreement as well as its
significance to the broader relationship. The agreement becomes a fo-
cal point around which expectations converge."5 Furthermore, by
communicating and exchanging information the governments come to
know their partners in the agreement and not merely know about
them.56 The participants in the enterprise come to inhabit a common
world - a world that does not simply come out of the shared beliefs
and attitudes of its inhabitants but in fact generates those beliefs and
attitudes through common participation. 7
52. Robert Jervis states that the main purpose of arms control agreements is to control ex-
pectations and beliefs, not arms. R. JERVIS, THE MEANING OF THE NUCLEAR REVOLUTION
225 (1987).
53. With respect to bilateral arms control, four decades of living with nuclear weapons gener-
ated a core of consensual knowledge shared by the superpowers that influenced beliefs, some-
times but not always resulting in explicit cooperation. See Nye, Nuclear Learning and U.S.-
Soviet Security Regimes, 41 INT'L ORG. 371, 382-83 (1987).
54. Id. at 398.
55. Id. at 399. See also T. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 54 (1963).
56. Robert Keohane argues that any government contemplating international cooperation
must know its potential partners in this way:
The information that is required in entering into an international regime is not merely infor-
mation about other governments' resources and formal negotiating positions, but rather
knowledge of their internal evaluations of the situation, their intentions, the intensity of
their preferences, and their willingness to adhere to an agreement even in adverse future
circumstances.
Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, supra note 6, at
141, 162-63.
57. In discussing social practices generally, Postema describes what it means to inhabit a
common world as follows:
This common world... is not constructed out of individual participants' beliefs or attitudes
or intentions or purposes. Instead, we participants have the beliefs and attitudes about it
that we have-we understand it as we do-by virtue of our common participation in it.
Similarly, moving about in this common world is not a matter of forming expectations about
the behavior of other participants, and their expectations of one's own behavior, through
observing their behavior or attempting to replicate their practical reasoning. Rather, we
[Vol. 12:371
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Subjective interpretation is constrained, both in terms of interpre-
tations that are actually proffered and those that become authoritative,
not by external rules of interpretation but by the existence of a rela-
tively unified interpretive community. When disputes over the mean-
ing of the text do arise, members of the community operate within a
common frame of reference as to how the dispute should be resolved.
Furthermore, the members share a predisposition toward arriving at a
mutually acceptable interpretation. Agreement is far from automatic,
because many words (and the rules, principles, purposes and policies
they convey) are ambiguous and manipulable, and the interests of the
parties will remain, in some respects, divergent. But the criterion of
mutual acceptability sets an outer limit on the extent to which they
can be manipulated. The limit is not a rule of interpretation but a
convention of the enterprise. The parties can argue with one another
about the meaning of words, but the mere fact that they argue with one
another (and not only within domestic constituencies) reflects their
continuing commitment to the relationship. The debate is constrained
because governments are impelled to justify their positions on grounds
other than national self-interest. 58 Otherwise their arguments would
not be persuasive to others nor accepted by members of the relevant
interpretive communities. The outer limit of an acceptable interpreta-
tion is not determined according to transcendent standards but ac-
cording to the shared standards and expectations of the relevant
community.
The process differs from negotiation in that the parties operate
within an institutional and intellectual framework already in place, a
framework they have implicitly agreed to respect. 59 Failure to respect
have expectations of the behavior and expectations of others because we recognize that we
participate in a common world.
Postema, supra note 40, at 313.
58. "The fact that nations feel obliged to justify their actions under international law, that
justifications must have plausibility, that plausible justifications are often unavailable or limited,
inevitably affects how nations will act." L. HENKIN, supra note 5, at 45. See also Schachter,
International Law in Theory and Practice, 178 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 59 (1982).
59. Thus Gloria Duffy overstates the point when she writes:
[B]ecause of the lack of enforcement mechanisms in the international arena, arms control
treaties are not like criminal statutes. Resolving disputes related to treaties, therefore, re-
quires a continuing negotiation rather than a simple determination of guilt or innocence.
What are claimed to be right and wrong interpretations of a treaty will be less persuasive
than what continues to be in the interests of both parties. What was intended when a treaty
was negotiated is likely to be less important than what the parties can continue to agree on
over time. And, when one or both sides refuse to participate in the ongoing negotiation, the
process cannot work.
G. DUFFY, COMPLIANCE AND THE FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL 201 (1988). While her analysis
may be correct descriptively, it is less helpful as a means of understanding the interpretive pro-
cess. Her focus on the importance of mutuality is appropriate, but to suggest that all interpretive
disputes should be resolved by renewed negotiations goes too far. Rational discourse over the
meaning of a treaty term is possible. If one side insists on an interpretation that diverges from
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that framework represents something more serious than a decision not
to agree on the specific terms of the relationship embodied in the
treaty - it represents a breakdown of that relationship. Obviously,
the constraint is not absolute, because, as indicated above, sovereign
States can withdraw from the relationship if they perceive that it is in
their interest to do so. But the constraint on interpretation does exist
insofar as certain interpretive activities and positions will be regarded
as inconsistent with the enterprise in which the text and interpreter are
situated. States may be able to abrogate a treaty but, as long as the
relationship embodied in the treaty continues to exist, the constraints
of treaty practice (of being in a relationship) limit interpretive
discretion. 6°
The conventions of the enterprise operate within the interpretive
community not only through expectations and beliefs, but also at the
institutional level. For example, in addition to creating international
obligations, a treaty acts as an internal directive guiding bureaucratic
behavior.61 Bureaucracies are notoriously status quo oriented; caution
rather than creativity and risk-taking characterizes bureaucratic be-
havior. Violation of an international agreement is not among the op-
tions that would typically be suggested by low-level officials when
decisions are being made within bureaucracies. 62 Furthermore, a
treaty inhibits not only conduct that is clearly prohibited by its terms,
but also activities falling within the doubtful zone.63 Low-level offi-
cials do not normally have any incentive to take responsibility for an
action that may become the basis for a charge of treaty violation. Of
course high-level officials are not inhibited in this way and the top
leadership sets goal priorities and policies. However, subordinates in-
fluence policy by providing information which effectively defines the
situation for superiors. The information provided by these low-level
the purposes and conventions of the interpretive community, then the other side should not be
expected to participate in renewed negotiations. It may choose to do so because its interest in
preserving the relationship outweighs its interest in insisting on its own interpretation, but that is
not inherent in the interpretive process. To argue that it is suggests there really are no interpre-
tive constraints.
60. Even the decision to withdraw from an arms control treaty under the terms of a with-
drawal clause is subject to indirect community judgment. The withdrawal right is explicitly
made a unilateral decision, but most treaties limit the exercise of the right to circumstances in
which "extraordinary events ... have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country." There is
no explicit provision for community judgment as to the adequacy of the justification for with-
drawal, but such judgment will work its way into the unilateral decision because any government
considering the exercise of its right will take into account the probable evaluations of its rationale
by other States. Chayes, An Inquiry Into the Working ofArms Control Agreements, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 905, 959 (1972). See also R. BILDER, supra note 42, at 54.
61. Chayes, supra note 60, at 935.
62. Id. at 935-36.
63. Id. at 937.
[Vol. 12:371
Treaty Interpretation
officials is a product of the climate of opinion that arose.from the pro-
cess of negotiating and ratifying the treaty.64 This climate of opinion
pervades the environment within which all political and bureaucratic
actors must function. 65 It is not easily overridden and thus the actors
must, in some measure, either adapt to the climate of opinion or reject
it with serious consequences. In this way, the interpretive community
that crystallizes around a treaty perpetuates itself. The decision to
break a treaty or withdraw from it will occur at the highest levels, but
interpretation is shaped by the underlying bureaucratic and organiza-
tional structure of any less-than-monolithic government.
B. The Broader Interpretive Community
Beyond the immediate interpretive community centered around
the treaty itself, interpretation is constrained by an amorphous com-
munity of all those regarded as possessing the knowledge of an expert
or professional in the relevant field. As Schachter explains, govern-
ments cannot escape legal appraisals of their conduct by other govern-
ments (expressed either individually or in collective bodies), political
parties, international lawyers, non-governmental organizations and
other organs of public opinion. 66 In the realm of military security, this
community judgment is influenced by the opinions of governmental
and non-governmental experts on international law, world politics and
strategic affairs. The competency or expertise comes from training
and immersion in some feature of the enterprise in which the experts
are engaged. 67 As participants in the field of practice, they have come
64. Phillip Trimble, in an illuminating account of the bureaucratic dimension of international
negotiation, makes the point that, while strong leadership can act innovatively in international
negotiations, the bureaucratic process "defines the options" and protects entrenched interests
and perspectives. Trimble, Arms Control and International Negotiation Theory, 25 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 543, 573 (1989). With respect to negotiations, the bureaucratic factor can inhibit initia-
tive, but it has the advantage of assuring compromise and protecting the important interests of
particular segments of the population. Id. at 571. With respect to interpretation, the bureau-
cracy plays a similar role in assuring compliance with the treaty as understood by the interpretive
community that crystallized around it.
65. Another way of characterizing this "climate of opinion" is suggested by Nye's notion of
an "institutional memory" that is generated as bureaucracies and groups function within a re-
gime. Nye, supra note 53, at 398.
66. Schachter, Self-Defense and the Rule of Law, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 259, 264 (1989).
67. In the field of public international law, Oscar Schachter has identified what he terms "the
invisible college of international lawyers":
That professional community, though dispersed throughout the world and engaged in di-
verse occupations, constitutes a kind of invisible college dedicated to a common intellectual
enterprise. As in the case of other disciplines, its members are engaged in a continuous
process of communication and collaboration. Evidence of this process is found in the jour-
nals and yearbooks of international law, in the transnational movement of professors and
students, and in the numerous conferences, seminars and colloquia held in all parts of the
globe. But this communication is by no means confined to the realm of scholarship. For the
international bodies and conferences of an official character are largely composed of jurists
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to understand its purposes and conventions, learned not merely as a
set of abstract rules but through the acquisition of know-how, a mas-
tering of the discipline or technique. 68 Having participated in the
techniques and discourse of international law, treaty interpretation
and/or the subject matter of the treaty, they have become competent
in the field. 69
The outlying interpretive community represents the institutional
mechanism closest to an impartial arbiter that the structure of treaty
auto-interpretation provides. It constrains interpretation primarily be-
cause States have an interest in maintaining a reputation for good faith
adherence to treaties. As Henkin states:
Every nation's foreign policy depends substantially on its "credit" - on
maintaining the expectation that it will live up to international mores
and obligations. Considerations of "honor," "prestige," "leadership,"
"influence," "reputation," which figure prominently in governmental de-
cisions, often weigh in favor of observing law. Nations generally desire a
reputation for principled behavior, for propriety and respectability. 70
This interest combined with the implicit agreement between the
parties to engage in intersubjective interpretation means the outlying
interpretive community effectively checks and structures the interpre-
tive activities of the parties. An interpretation put forward by an offi-
cial agent does not acquire authoritative status by that fact alone.
Rather, it works as a signal within an interpretive system or "mecha-
nism for the endless negotiation of what will be authorized or
who are part of the active professional community and who maintain intellectual contact
with the scholarly side of the profession. The invisible college thus extends into the sphere
of government, resulting in a pdndtration pacifique of ideas from the nongovernmental into
official channels.
Schachter, The Invisible College of International Lawyers, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 217, 217 (1977).
68. Postema, supra note 40, at 304. Postema relies on Wittgenstein's philosophy of language
in making this point: "To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To under-
stand a language means to be master of a technique." L. WITrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL IN-
VESTIGATIONS, para. 199 (1953). See also Fish, supra note 2, at 1331-32, where Stanley Fish
makes a similar argument invoking Thomas Kuhn's position in T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 46 (2d ed. 1970).
69. Article 38(l)(d) of the ICJ Statute stipulates that the teachings of only the "most highly
qualified publicists" should be consulted in ascertaining the law. See supra note 1. Presumably
the "interpretive community" confers the status of "most highly qualified publicist" on some of
its members and not on others.
70. L. HENKIN, supra note 5, at 52. Of course the importance of reputation does not always
produce restraint, as States also have a stake in a reputation for resolve and for carrying through
on threats, etc. See R. JERVIS, THE LOGIC OF IMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 78-83
(2d ed. 1989). This highlights one advantage of bilateral and multilateral treaties over customary
law and other less formal norms, principles and procedures that permeate international affairs:
the former engage a country's honor in a way that the latter may not. The desire to maintain a
reputation for toughness and resolve will rarely suffice as a reason for overriding a treaty com-
mitment. In fact, emphasis on the importance of compliance with a particular treaty can operate
as a face-saving way of exercising restraint when concerns about reputation generate pressure to
act forcefully.
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nonauthorized. ' 7 1  It is evaluated by the outlying community and
judged in terms of its conformity with the conventions and purposes of
the enterprise. 72 In this way, the international interpretive community
monitors the parties and provides indirect reassurance to each that the
other or others will not engage in subjective interpretation. The influ-
ence of this community is felt directly in terms of explicit evaluations
of the appropriateness of a particular interpretation and indirectly in
the way States measure their own interpretations against anticipated
judgment of the international community. Because all States have a
stake in maintaining a reputation for good faith compliance with
treaty commitments, they will hesitate before publicly announcing a
construction likely to be branded as improper or far-fetched. Of
course, they may elect to do so, but that only signifies that the con-
straint is not absolute: it does not count as an argument against the
existence of a constraint.
C. The Legal Adviser
Within this interpretive system, government legal advisers play a
special role. They have been described variously as the "custodians
and exponents" of international law73 and as "partisans in an intense
global struggle... [in which] elaborate claims are made about motiva-
tions, historical destiny, about who is oppressing whom, and about
who is aggressor and who victim." 74 In the literature on legal advis-
ers,75 much is made of the tension between their role as advocates for
particular government positions and as objective interpreters of inter-
national law. While this tension is important in practice, it is less
71. S. FIsH, supra note 12, at 357. Fish is referring to the literary field where even the idea of
an "interpretive system" is controversial. His description, if anything, is more apposite to treaty
interpretation, where the very enterprise assumes the existence of some sort of system or mecha-
nism for authoritative interpretation.
72. The treaty itself or the customary practice of the parties may specify the methodology to
be adopted in interpreting the treaty (e.g., the extent to which the negotiating record should be
relied upon and the significance of subsequent practice). More general interpretive conventions
are embodied in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, decisions of the ICJ, State prac-
tice and the writings of legal scholars.
73. Macdonald, The Role of the Legal Adviser of Ministries of Foreign Affairs, RECUEIL DES
COURs 377, 386 (1977).
74. Falk, supra note 9, at 329.
75. Several general studies on legal advisers have been undertaken. See LEGAL ADVISERS
AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS (H. Merillat ed. 1964); Macdonald, supra note 73. See also Fitzmaurice,
Legal Advisers and Foreign Affairs (Review Article), 59 Am. J. INT'L L. 72 (1965); Gutteridge,
Foreign Policy and the Government Legal Adviser, 2 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. (Supp. 2) 71
(1972); Schwebel, Foreign Policy and the Government Legal Adviser, 2 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
(Supp. 2) 77 (1972); Darwin, Foreign Policy and the Government Legal Adviser, 2 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. (Supp. 2) 85 (1972); P. CORBETT, LAW IN DIPLOMACY (1959). For a detailed study
focusing on the American situation, see Bilder, The Office of the LegalAdviser: The State Depart-
ment Lawyer and Foreign Affairs, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 633 (1962).
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problematic as a matter of theory. The legal adviser is the main con-
nection between the international legal system and the domestic polit-
ical process. Like all government officials involved in foreign policy,
he or she must appeal to both domestic and international constituen-
cies. But more than any other government official, the legal adviser
must be concerned with the acceptability of interpretations to the in-
ternational community and thus has a unique institutional responsibil-
ity to ensure that the conventions of the relevant interpretive
community are respected. The institutional role requires a responsive-
ness to the practices of that community; training and immersion in
those practices means that the legal adviser will tend to conform to the
conventions out of professional habit.
Various commentators have characterized the role of legal adviser
in terms that correspond to the idea of an authoritative interpretive
community. Thomas Franck emphasizes the adviser's role in broad-
ening the frame of reference within which the national interest is de-
fined by including perspectives other than "the constituency
perspective, the Parliamentary perspective, even the here-and-now
perspective. ' 76 Louis Henkin describes the legal adviser as "the con-
science of the foreign office, as the spokesman for ... his country's
long-term interest in legal order and stability-as against the claims of
some immediate advantage."' 77 Joyce Gutteridge states that, because
legal advisers (in the United States at least) do not rotate as often as
other foreign policy personnel, they function as an institutional mem-
ory, providing continuity and stability to aspects of foreign affairs. 78
And because they are in constant contact, formally and informally,
with many operatives within the domestic political and bureaucratic
process, they serve as a channel of communication between the mem-
76. Franck, Discussion of Address by Allan E. Gotlieb, 1972 PROc. CONF. CAN. COUNCIL ON
INT'L L. 165.
77. L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE, supra note 5, at 67. See also LEGAL ADVISERS
AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 75, at 16.
78. Gutteridge, supra note 75, at 73. See also Bilder, supra note 73, at 641-42. Writing in
1959, Percy Corbett offers this account of the stabilizing influence of the legal office:
Prudent governments have always deliberated before taking decisive action, and an adven-
turous one will despise established routine; but the internal reference to legal advisers which
is now normal constitutes one of the more constant factors making for order and peaceful
settlement in the relations of States .... Even if they had no further result, standing arrange-
ments for consultation impose a spatium deliberandi between stimulus and response, a cool-
ing-off period in which the impulse to violence often loses its force. But it would be quite
unrealistic to rate their effect so low. Certainly the British record shows that the officers to
whom the Foreign Office has turned for legal advice have not merely delayed action; they
have at times determined policy.
P. CORBETT, supra note 75, at 35.
For a discussion of the various systems of legal counselling in foreign offices, see LEGAL
ADVISERS AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 75, at 1-14; Macdonald, supra note 73, at 414-53.
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bers of that community. 79
Another way of looking at the role of the legal adviser is as the
medium through which law is transmitted in the international system.
Interstate communication is imperfect: international institutions and
law ameliorate the situation by providing a common frame of refer-
ence. The legal adviser is the person who has prime responsibility for
articulating and expressing the law to the interested community,
within both the domestic and international settings. Coordination and
compliance are not automatic but, by ensuring that legal forms of ar-
gument are introduced into decision-making processes, the legal ad-
viser has an important stabilizing influence.
In performing this communicative function a legal adviser "will be
expected to ... express an opinion or give a ruling that will meet the
test of legal credibility."'80 Credibility flows from the degree to which
the legal adviser is responsive and responsible to the relevant interpre-
tive communities. Since the enterprise is intersubjective, legal advisers
can be expected to address themselves to the assumptions and under-
standings of the other parties to the treaty. This is not to say that legal
advisers have an institutional responsibility to accept the other parties'
interpretations. Rather, the interpretive activity is shaped by the ad-
viser's consideration of whether a given interpretation is likely to be
acceptable to other parties and, if not, why not. Furthermore, this
intellectual exercise requires legal advisers to be sensitive to the unique
position they occupy within the interpretive system given their prox-
imity to the politics of situations and access to confidential facts.81
Interpretations based on undisclosed facts and unstated assumptions
are not likely to be accepted.
Finally, legal arguments and interpretive strategies will take a cer-
tain form that must be respected by the legal adviser if they are to
meet the test of credibility. These forms and strategies are not infi-
nitely manipulable because, beyond an outer limit, they will not be
persuasive nor even recognized as legal by the interested community.
Anyone engaging in international legal discourse is necessarily con-
strained by the argumentative techniques of that enterprise. Conceiva-
bly, the relevant actors could simply refuse to conform to the
conventions of the activity but, as will be shown by the following case
study, legal discourse is a vital feature of relations between States even
in the realm of military security.
79. Bilder, supra note 75, at 642.
80. Schachter, supra note 58, at 50.
81. Bilder, supra note 75, at 674.
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IV. CASE STUDY: THE ABM REINTERPRETATION DEBATE
A. Introduction
Before turning to the ABM reinterpretation debate, several general
points relevant to the operation of interpretive communities associated
with superpower arms control can be made. Nuclear politics are con-
ditioned by the long-term relationship between the superpowers (and
other interested States) - a relationship they have a mutual stake in
preserving given the alternative of nuclear war. A common aversion
to nuclear war both makes arms control agreements possible and pro-
vides some assurance that both sides will adhere to the treaty even in
the absence of an enforcement mechanism, and even when it may not
be in the immediate interest of one or the other to do so. Thus, while
an arms control agreement is in some respects like a contract without
sanctions, it is a contract situated within a relationship of indefinite
duration based on reciprocity. This situation, in turn, structures inter-
pretation of the agreement.
Arms control is fundamentally a political process. As Joseph Nye
argues, in a sense all of arms control is a confidence- and security-
building measure in that it increases communication and trans-
parency. 82 Negotations provide a means of reducing uncertainty: the
development of common perceptions is often more important to the
process than the exchange of concessions. 83 All negotiators are en-
gaged partly in finding a common definition of the subject of the nego-
tiations; in arms control the situation to be defined is strategic. In
strategic relations, "reality" is inextricably intertwined with the sub-
jective perceptions of each superpower. The beliefs each side holds
about the many questions of nuclear politics constitute an important
part of the reality with which the other has to contend.84 Thus, one
cannot describe a perception of some aspect of the strategic situation
as being accurate without reference to the other side's perceptions. 85
In a sense, through their ongoing interaction, the superpowers con-
struct the reality within which they form judgments about one an-
other. The entire process of entering into an arms control agreement
and conducting the relationship according to its terms is a process of
82. Nye, Arms Control After the Cold War, 68 FOREIGN AFF., Winter 1989/90, at 42, 45.
83. Winham, Negotiation as a Management Process, 30 WORLD POL. 87, 97 (1977).
84. See R. JERVIS, supra note 52, at 7.
85. For example, the strategic significance of a particular weapon system does not turn on its
"objective" qualities so much as the qualities each side perceives it as having. Furthermore, the
perceived qualities of a weapon system are only part of the strategic reality; as important are the
perceptions each side has of the State's willingness to use it, in what circumstances and to what
end.
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constructing reality together. Thus, the language and the context of
the treaty are instrumental in defining the reality that it purports to
regulate.
Institutionally, the making of an arms control agreement results in
the alignment of political and bureaucratic forces pushing in the direc-
tion of compliance. Politically, arms control agreements generate
shared perceptions about common interests.8 6 Within each State, the
negotiation and ratification process subjects the treaty to consensus-
building around the norms contained in it, a situation Abram Chayes
describes as follows:
(1) by the time the treaty is adopted, a broad consensus within govern-
mental and political circles will be arrayed in support of the decision; (2)
meanwhile, principal centers of potential continuing opposition will have
been neutralized or assuaged ... ; and (3) many officials, leaders of the
administration or regime and opponents as well, will have been person-
ally and publicly committed to the treaty, creating a kind of political
imperative for the success of the policy.8 7
These phenomena are manifest in a predisposition towards compli-
ance, not shared by everyone, but sufficiently widespread to dominate
the climate of opinion and direction of policy.
These shared perceptions may become institutionalized in bilateral
mechanisms for communication, like the hotline and the Standing
Consultative Commission, which make it easier for the States to ex-
plain why they are behaving as they are.88 Not only is consultation
easier in the event of a dispute, but mutual awareness of interests, per-
spectives and expectations is also enhanced. Furthermore, even with-
out direct communication, bureaucratic forces within each State
generate an institutional phenomenon having the same effect. The ne-
gotiation and ratification process produces a set of standard operating
procedures and organizational routines that tend to induce compli-
ance.8 9 Furthermore, new coalition opportunities for subnational ac-
tors arise and institutional contacts may produce attitudinal changes
86. For example, as Robert Jervis states:
Arms agreements show that the United States and the USSR realize that arms levels are a
matter of mutual concern that must be negotiated rather than being produced by unilateral
decisions. They acknowledge that the Soviet-American competition is not total, that what is
often more important than unilateral advantage is reaching settlements that are good for
both sides, and that limiting national autonomy can help reach common objectives.
R. JERVIS, supra note 52, at 224.
87. Chayes, supra note 60, at 920.
88. Jervis, From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation, in CooP-
ERATION UNDER ANARCHY 58, 73-74 (K. Oye ed. 1986).
89. R. BILDER, supra note 42, at 9. See also F. IKLt, How NATIONS NEGOTIATE 8 (1964),
where he points to the "institutional obstacles" to violation of a treaty. A seminal book analyz-
ing the impact of the organizational process and bureaucratic politics on foreign policy in the
United States and the Soviet Union is G. ALLISON, THE ESSENCE OF DECISION (1971). For a
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among those who were previously opposed to the agreement. 90 A par-
allel phenomenon occurs within the government of the other party to
the treaty, so a bilateral community with shared interests and percep-
tions emerges as an institutional check on the less cooperative forces
within the respective systems. 91
B. The ABM Treaty Reinterpretation
The saga of the debate over interpretation of the ABM Treaty is
well-documented. It is not my purpose to enter that debate but rather
to analyze it with a view to drawing conclusions about the significance
of "interpretive communities" to the interpretive process. 92 As a pre-
liminary observation, the reinterpretation gave rise to debate on two
related but distinct issues: the factual merits of the new interpretation
and the constitutional authority for asserting it.93 Most of the debate
within the United States has centered on the constitutional issue, ob-
scuring the purely international legal question. The present discussion
focuses on the latter, but it will be apparent that the two are
intertwined.
more recent discussion of bureaucratic influences on the American side of arms control negotia-
tions, see Trimble, supra note 64.
90. Nye offers the following quote from a chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as evidence of
a change in bureaucratic definitions of self-interest: "As we got deeper into arms control came
recognition of its increasing importance-that neither side could gain through nuclear war."
Nye, supra note 53, at 395!
91. Less is known about the negotiating and decision-making process in the Soviet Union
than in the United States, but even in 1972 it was possible to get some sense of a bureaucratic and
political process not wholly unlike that in the United States. Chayes, supra note 60, at 909. An
illuminating recent discussion of the similarities and differences between the American and So-
viet systems can be found in G. DUFFY, supra note 59. The author points out that the Soviet
Union lacks the legislative and public constituencies that lobby for compliance with arms control
agreements in the United States. Id. at 139. Clearly, fewer checks and balances operate on
permissive interpretation in the Soviet Union, but the system has never been so monolithic (and
is becoming less so) that important foreign policy decisions could be made without some form of
political consensus extending beyond the top leadership. Apparently the SALT regime tipped
the balance between contending long-run expectations about the United States in Soviet
Politburo politics in the moderate direction. Nye, Nuclear Learning, supra note 53, at 395. See
also Jackson, Soviet Images of the US. as Nuclear Adversary, 1969-1979, 33 WORLD POL. 614,
619-20 (1981). Gloria Duffy speculates that the U.S. use of the Standing Consultative Commis-
sion in 1981-83 might have brought compliance issues to the attention of a wider spectrum of
actors within the Soviet government, i.e., other than the military. Furthermore, apparently
Gorbachev made institutional changes in the domestic Soviet structure for formulating arms
control policy, creating new departments that "could play an internal advocacy role ... for a
more conservative approach to arms control compliance," thereby institutionalizing interests in
compliance. G. DUFFY, supra note 59, at 161.
92. This is not to say that assessments of correctness are pointless or nonsensical. Indeed,
the thesis of this paper is that the activity of the interpretive community revolves around disputa-
tion and the presentation of evidence in an effort to persuade the unconvinced of the correctness
of a particular interpretation.
93. Koplow, Constitutional Bait and Switch: Executive Reinterpretation of Arms Control
Treaties, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1353, 1370 (1989).
Treaty Interpretation
The Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems was
signed in May 1972, along with the SALT I Interim Agreement. 94 It
came after a period in which both the United States and the Soviet
Union had tried, unsuccessfully, to find a defense against nuclear
weapons. Ultimately, the decision-makers concluded that, not only
would an ABM system not work, it would touch off a spiraling offen-
sive/defensive arms race and increase the risks of nuclear war.95 After
one unsuccessful attempt to bring the Soviets to the negotiating table,
followed by the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, negotiations were
conducted from 1969 to 1972 culminating in the signing of the ABM
Treaty along with the SALT I Agreement.
Through a series of quantitative and qualitative limits on ABM
systems and components, the Treaty was designed to prevent either
side from constructing a nationwide defense against strategic ballistic
missiles. 96 The main disagreement that subsequently arose between
the two sides of the debate was over the scope of restraints on exotic
space-based technology (i.e., the Strategic Defense Initiative). The
Treaty divides the steps involved in construction of an ABM system
into four phases: research, development, testing and deployment. Ini-
tially, SDI was billed as a research program, which all agree would be
permitted by the ABM Treaty as long as the program remains in its
research phase. There is also now agreement that deployment of SDI
would be a violation of the Treaty unless it is amended by mutual
agreement. The issue is whether the intermediate phases, development
and testing, are permissible. On October 6, 1985, National Security
Adviser Robert McFarlane announced that "on research involving
new physical concepts .... that activity, as well as testing, as well as
development, indeed, are approved and authorized by the treaty." '97
Dismayed reactions from Congress and NATO allies led to a meeting
of senior Reagan Administration officials, the result of which was a
compromise position announced by Secretary of State George Schultz
on October 14, claiming that the new interpretation was "fully justi-
fied" but "a moot point" because the administration would continue to
conduct the program "in accordance with a restrictive interpretation
of the treaty's obligations."98 Political controversy was temporarily
quieted, but the underlying issue was not resolved, and the option of
94. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballisitic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, United States
- U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503.
95. ARMS CONTROL ASS'N, ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY 70 (1989).
96. Id. at 71.
97. Mr. McFarlane's Interview on "Meet the Press," 85 DEP'T ST. BULL. 32, 33 (Dec. 1985).
98. Schultz, Arms Control, Strategic Stability, and Global Security, 85 DEP'T ST. BULL. 20,
23 (Dec. 1985).
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adopting the reinterpretation as official policy in the future was left
open. The debate in policy-making and legal circles has ebbed and
flowed ever since. 99
The main legal issue revolves around the interpretation of articles
II and V and Agreed Statement D; specifically, whether the ban on
development and testing of space-based and mobile systems applies
only to technology that existed in 1972.100 An ABM system is defined
in article II as "a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their
elements in flight trajectory, 'currently consisting of' " ABM intercep-
tor missiles, launchers and radars.' 0 ' Under article III, each party
"undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except"
designated fixed land-based systems at two sites each, reduced to one
by a 1974 protocol. Article IV stipulates that the limitations provided
for in article III do not apply to ABM systems or their components
used for "development and testing, and located within current or...
agreed test ranges." Under article V, "[ejach party undertakes not to
develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-
based, air-based, or mobile land-based." Only research on these sys-
tems is permitted. The parties also dealt with "exotic" systems in
Agreed Statement D, which provides that "in the event ABM systems
based on other physical principles and including components capable
of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or
ABM radars are created in the future, specific limitations on such sys-
tems and their components would be subject to discussion . . . and
agreement."
The core issue is whether article II defines an ABM system func-
99. At this point, the debate has subsided. It was put to rest indefinitely with Congress' vote
to maintain defense spending within the limits of the traditional interpretation (see infra note Ill
and accompanying text). Since then, political events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
have overtaken the arms control process. Discussions over alternative strategic roles for SDI
continue, but it is unlikely that the traditional interpretation will be contravened in the near
future. Congress continues to tie spending authorizations to the traditional interpretation, and
the program itself is being scaled down. The latest blow to the program came in late October
1990, when Congress voted to end its financing of X-ray laser research as a separate item in the
Federal budget. Congress Deals Near-Fatal Blow to 'Star' of Star Wars Plan, N.Y. Times, Oct.
21, 1990, at A29, col. 3. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union has dropped its earlier position that no
START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) agreement could be signed until the two countries
agreed on an interpretation of the ABM Treaty, although it continues to insist that any U.S.
violation of the restrictive interpretation would be considered grounds for withdrawal from
START. The issue will probably not stand in the way of signing the treaty, although it could
resurface when START is presented to the Senate for ratification. MacDonald, Falling Star:
SDI's Troubled Seventh Year, 20 ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Sept. 1990, at 7, 9.
100. For a detailed synopsis of the points of disagreement on each article, see S. NUNN,
INTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY. PART I: THE SENATE RATIFICATION PROCEEDINGS
14-19, reprinted in 133 CONG. REC. 5302, 5304-05 (1987).
101. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, supra note 94, at art. It
(emphasis added).
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tionally, with "current" components mentioned for illustrative pur-
poses, or whether it is a limiting definition, indicating that it applies
only to those types of systems specifically mentioned in the article (i.e.
interceptor missiles, launchers and radars). A functional definition of
article II, preferred by the strict interpretationists, would indicate that
whenever the term "ABM system" is employed in the Treaty text, it
includes future as well as current technology. Thus, according to the
restrictive interpretation, article V bans the development, testing and
deployment of all space-based/mobile exotics, and article IV would
allow development and testing of fixed, land-based exotics at agreed
test ranges. Agreed Statement D simply clarifies and strengthens the
restriction on deployment of fixed ABM systems to two sites. If test-
ing or deployment of land-based exotics pursuant to article IV leads
either side to propose deployment of such a system, then limitations
should be negotiated at that time. Barring agreement, the prohibition
on deployment remains presumptively in effect. 10 2
According to proponents of the broad interpretation, while the
functional approach is plausible, a better reading of article II defines
an ABM system as "one that serves the functions described and that
consists of the type of components that existed 'currently' (that is, at
the time the Treaty was signed)."'t°3 On this reading, the article V ban
on testing and development of space-based and mobile "ABM sys-
tems" would not include those based on "other physical principles."
Agreed Statement D, then, would be the only provision governing fu-
ture technologies, and since it only mentions deployment, it should be
read as banning deployment of exotics but not their testing and
development.104
C. The Interpretive Community and the ABM Treaty
There is little doubt that a vital "interpretive community" has been
at work throughout the reinterpretation debate. The mere fact that
the debate has persisted for more than five years is evidence that, de-
spite the crucial policy issue at stake, the Treaty, even with its impreci-
102. S. NUNN, supra note 100, at 7.
103. Sofaer, The ABM Treaty and the Strategic Defense Initiative, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1972,
1974 (1986).
104. Resolution of the debate as outlined above one way or the other will not solve all of the
interpretive problems. If the narrow interpretation is adhered to, questions remain as to the
meaning of "develop," "test" and "component" within article V. See T. LONGSTRETH, J. PIKE
& J. RHINELANDER, THE IMPACT OF THE U.S. AND SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PRO-
GRAMS ON THE ABM TREATY 23-30 (3d ed, 1985). If the reinterpretation governs, what consti-
tutes a "new physical principle" becomes a an issue. R. GARTHOFF, POLICY VERSUS THE LAW:
THE REINTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY 92 (1987). See also Harbour, The ABM Treaty,
New Technology and the Strategic Defense Initiative, 15 J. LEGIS. 119, 133 (1989).
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sion and ambiguity, has served as a constraint on American decision-
makers.' 05 While much of the debate has been over constitutional
questions rather than international law per se, it is clear that interna-
tional legal constraints have played a significant role. Furthermore,
the constitutional battle operated as a forum for airing the interna-
tional legal issues. It is reasonable to conclude that if the constitu-
tional battle had not occurred, as lively a debate would have occurred
within the international legal community, if not in Congress.
It is impossible to establish what weight various factors have car-
ried in the reluctance to embrace fully the broad interpretation as offi-
cial policy. Undoubtedly, the decisions made by the Reagan and Bush
administrations at each step of the way have been based on percep-
tions of national interest. The constraining effect of the interpretive
community was probably felt most strongly at the start of the debate.
Even when the initial reinterpretation was announced, skepticism
within the Reagan Administration precipitated the compromise posi-
tion in which the United States committed itself to abide by the tradi-
tional limits without disavowing the reinterpretation.
That the decisions were made primarily on the basis of national
interest does not mean that legal considerations were irrelevant. Na-
tional interest depends in part on intangibles like a reputation for ad-
hering to agreements. Endorsing the reinterpretation would have had
a significant impact on U.S.-Soviet relations and on the United States'
reputation in the international community. The knowledge that the
United States could not afford to ignore the legal opinions of the rele-
vant interpretive communities influenced the decisions. Before the
constitutional issues came to the fore, and even after they did, Ameri-
can officials were constrained by the concern that Soviet decision-mak-
ers would regard the reinterpretation as a disingenuous means of
circumventing the treaty's limitations, and by criticism from a signifi-
cant body of international experts whose views influence world public
opinion.
Tangible evidence of a functioning "interpretive community" can
105. That this point needs to be made at all may seem surprising, but some have argued that
the "fundamental question" was solely whether SDI was in the national security interest of the
United States, and that to question the legal propriety of the reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty
was like arguing about "how many angels dance on the head of a pin." The ABM Treaty and the
Constitution: Joint Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations and the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3, 17 (1987) (statement of Senator Evans)
[hereinafter Joint Hearings]. In the same hearings, Senator Wallop stated that "questions of
interpretation are a lawyer's exercise ... [the fundamental question is whether the ABM Treaty
remains valid] in terms of our own national security." R. GARTHOFF, supra note 104, at 97. In
rejoinder, Senator Biden stated: "What is at issue here is decidedly not a lawyers' quarrel. We
are witnessing a major assault on the premises and structure of a national nuclear strategy ..
Joint Hearings, supra at 263.
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be found, first, by identifying the main protagonists in the debate.
Within the United States, the key actors were government officials
with special responsibilities and expertise in the field. The leading
spokesperson for the broad interpretation is Abraham Sofaer, the State
Department Legal Adviser. His involvement began shortly after he
was named to the post, when he reported to Secretary of State Schultz
and Ambassador Paul Nitze, on October 3, 1985, that the negotiating
record could support the broad interpretation of the Treaty. 10 6 He
testified to that effect in House Arms Control hearings in 1985,107 and
contributed a detailed article to the Harvard Law Review in 1986.108
Sofaer's main ally in presenting the arguments for a broad interpreta-
tion was Paul Nitze (a member of ABM Treaty negotiating team),
who testified in the 1985 hearings and prepared a statement for the
Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs in 1986.1"9
Key American proponents of the narrow interpretation are most of
the senior members of the ABM Treaty negotiating team, including
Ambassador Gerard Smith, legal adviser John, Rhinelander, senior ad-
visor Raymond Garthoff and Lieutenant General Royal B. Allison."10
Congress, led by Senator Sam Nunn, the influential ranking Democrat
on the Senate Armed Services Committee, joined the fray and ulti-
mately came down on the side of the narrow interpretation, effectively
forcing the Reagan Administration to abide by the traditional limits
established by the Treaty."' The release of Nunn's analysis of the
text, ratification process and subsequent practice was a crucial event in
the debate." 2 Academic experts, especially legal scholars, have writ-
106. R. GARTHOFF, supra note 104, at 8.
107. ABM Treaty Interpretation Dispute: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Arms Control,
International Security and Science of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
4, 13 (1985).
108. Sofaer, supra note 103, at 1972. See also Sofaer's three-part analysis reprinted in the
Congressional Record. A. SOFAER, THE ABM TREATY, reprinted in 133 CONG. REC. 12,839-
910 and 133 CONG REC. daily ed. Sept. 16, 1987) S12, 181-84.
109. BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CURRENT POLICY No. 886, PER-
MITTED AND PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES UNDER THE ABM TREATY (1986).
110. See R. GARTHOFF, supra note 104; Rhinelander & Ruben, Mission Accomplished: An
Insider's Account of the ABM Treaty Negotiating Record, 17 ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Sept. 1987,
at 3.
111. Both the Senate and the House amended their respective defense appropriations bills
declaring that no funds could be used for SDI tests other than those previously announced,
which had already been determined to conform with the narrow interpretation. National De-
fense Authorization Act for FY 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-180, 101 Stat. 1019, 1056
(1987). See also The ABM Treaty Interpretation Resolution, S. Rep. No. 164, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1987).
112. See S. Nunn, supra note 100. Nunn's prominence in the debate, of course, is attributa-
ble to the constitutional dimensions of the issue. Nevertheless, his contribution was in the form
of traditional legal analysis, from which constitutional implications flowed. Furthermore, the
active involvement of Congress in the debate is, in itself, evidence of an institutionalized interpre-
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ten extensively on the issue. 1 13 Also, a number of interest groups, such
as the Lawyers Alliance for Nuclear Arms Control, the Arms Control
Association and the Committee to Save the ABM Treaty, mobilized
against the reinterpretation.1 14 Finally, the Soviets expressed consis-
tent and strong opposition to the reinterpretation, nowhere more than
in the START negotiations, and even a number of important U.S. al-
lies had serious reservations about the new interpretation or were op-
posed to it. I'5
Second, the debate has been carried on in distinctly legal terms,
with the protagonists relying on the standard materials and techniques
of treaty interpretation. In accordance with the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties (signed but not ratified by the United States),
the American Law Institute Restatement of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States, and customary law principles, most of the
argument has been over text, subsequent practice, the negotiation
records and material from the Senate ratification process. For present
purposes, it is most interesting that these principles, and the manner in
which they have been applied, indicate implicit recognition of the au-
thority of interpretive communities. The weight given to subsequent
statements and practice, for example, is consistent with the idea that
the meaning of the relationship is constructed collectively, over
time.", 6 To the extent that subsequent practice is accorded independ-
tive community: an unsurprising fact as a matter of constitutional law but nevertheless relevant
to the thesis here advanced.
113. A significant early contribution is from Abram Chayes, a former State Department
Legal Adviser. See Chayes & Chayes, Testing and Development of "Exotic" Systems Under the
ABM Treaty: The Great Reinterpretation Caper, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1972 (1986). See also COM-
MIT-rEE ON INTERNATIONAL ARMS CONTROL AND SECURITY AFFAIRS, ASSOCIATION OF THE
BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, THE ABM TREATY INTERPRETATION DISPUTE (1988);
Sherr, Sound Legal Reasoning or Policy Expedient?, 11 INT'L SECURITY 71 (1986-87); Harbour,
supra note 104, at 119. A recent series of articles and commentaries on the constitutional issues
raised by the reinterpretation can be found in 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1353-1559 (1989).
114. Trimble, supra note 89, at 558, n.32.
115. Koplow, supra note 93, at 1372; R. GARTHOFF, supra note 104, at 3, 16, 81-89. For
many years, the START negotiations were held up by, among other things, the Soviet insistence
that no START agreement would be signed without a repudiation of the ABM Treaty.
116. See Postema, supra note 40, at 309. In this regard, Judge Sofaer's comment on the
relevance of post-negotiation statements, while constitutionally suspect, is interesting for the
light it sheds on the notion of intersubjective interpretation:
In examining these post-negotiation statements, one must remember that they are unilateral
pronouncements. Even if they clearly demonstrated a consistent United States view-which
they do not-they cannot bind the Soviet Union to that view. The strongest evidence of
what the parties agreed is the Treaty itself, supported by its negotiating record.
Sofaer, supra note 103, at 1984-85. For a recent reiteration and elaboration of his view, see
Sofaer, Treaty Interpretation: A Comment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1437 (1989). His argument in the
case of the ABM Treaty would be stronger if there were more evidence of a Soviet position that
deviated from the statements and practice of American officials in the ratification process and
afterwards. In fact, the preponderance of evidence indicates that the Soviet position was conso-
nant with the narrow interpretation, thus American statements and practice along those lines
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ent weight and not merely treated as evidence of original intentions, 117
the procedure is not totally unlike the activities of literary critics who
are necessarily influenced by the interpretations of a text espoused by
their predecessors. Those interpretations form part of the institutional
context that shapes the perspectives of subsequent professional
readers.
Another feature of treaty interpretation relevant to this discussion
of interpretive communities is the fact that less weight is assigned to
negotiating records than to text and subsequent practice," 18 partly be-
cause the records are often classified or unpublished.' 19 Rational dis-
course and persuasion is not possible if the material treated as relevant
to the interpretive enterprise is accessible only to a few. The point is
not purely academic: in late 1985, Senator Nunn and other senators
began pressing the administration for release of the negotiating record
of the ABM Treaty, which was finally done in August 1986, under
strict rules of access. ' 20 It has been suggested that the controversy will
not be resolved finally until the record is made available to the public
or a bipartisan review commission.' 21 Yet, for international purposes
(i.e. apart from constitutional considerations), access to the negotiat-
ing record is not essential to the resolution of interpretive disputes.
Examination of the record is only required to the extent that it is ac-
cepted practice: the parties to the ABM Treaty agreed that the record
was not "unilateral." See R. GARTHOFF, supra note 104, at 80-88. The constitutional wrangle
was settled with the INF Treaty ratification to which the Senate attached a condition requiring
that the treaty be interpreted "in accordance with the common understanding of the treaty
shared by the President and the Senate at the time that the Senate gave its advice and consent...
and the United States shall not agree to or adopt an interpretation different from that common
understanding except pursuant to Senate advice and consent to a subsequent treaty or protocol,
or the enactment of a statute." ARMS CONTROL ASS'N, THE ABM TREATY AND NATIONAL
SECURITY 71-72 (1990).
117. "Action by the parties in reliance upon asserted or implicit interpretations during the
course of performing an agreement is appropriately regarded as reliable evidence of shared sub-
jectivities and may be given priority over contradictory evidence even from the outcome phase."
McDoUGAL ET AL., supra note 4, at 58-59.
118. Article 32 of the Vienna Convention reads:
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory
work of the treaty and the circumstance of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning
resulting from the application of article 31 [text, context and subsequent practice], or to
determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 32, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf.39/27 (1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679, 692 (1969).
119. P. REUTER, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TREATIES 76 (2d ed. 1989).
120. R. GARTHOFF, supra note 104, at 11. Not surpisingly, the main protagonists in the
interpretive debate were those who had access to the record, like Senator Nunn, and those who
participated in the negotiations, such as Smith, Garthoff and Rhinelander.
121. G. DUFFY, supra note 59, at 129.
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would not be public.t 22 Nevertheless, one would expect the interpret-
ers to be sensitive to the fact that relevant audiences will not easily be
persuaded by an interpretation based on evidence to which they have
no access. 1
23
While there is evidence of an active interpretive community in the
ABM Treaty reinterpretation debate, there is also evidence that the
Reagan Administration failed to respect the conventions of that com-
munity. First, the Administration's contradictory signals regarding
the ABM Treaty hampered debate and, given the avowed intention to
remain within the narrow interpretation, much of it has been carried
on in the abstract. 24 Furthermore, the origins of the reinterpretation
are suspect in that it was put forth (within the U.S. government) by a
young Department of Defense lawyer who had no experience with
arms control or treaty interpretation. 25 When the matter was turned
over to the State Department's Legal Adviser's Office, three new attor-
neys appointed by Sofaer were given the task of reviewing the record.
The process lasted two and a half weeks, during which only some of
the relevant material was reviewed and none of the ABM Treaty nego-
tiators other than Paul Nitze was consulted. 26 Meanwhile, simultane-
ous analyses conducted by the Department of Defense assistant
general counsel and the general counsel of the Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency rejected the reinterpretation. 27 These assessments
were either overridden or not brought to the attention of policymakers
before the Administration position was announced.' 28 Furthermore,
the Administration's case for the broad interpretation, when an-
nounced, was based almost entirely on the negotiating record rather
than subsequent practice, contrary to accepted treaty interpretation
principles. In fact, Sofaer's study of subsequent practice was not com-
122. Nor is it a convention of treaty interpretation generally. See Vienna Convention, supra
note 118, art 32. See also Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube, 1927 P.C.I.J.
(ser. B) No. 14, at 32 (Dec. 8) (refusal by the Permanent Court of International Justice to con-
sider "confidential" negotiating record).
123. Abram Chayes' sensitivity to this point is revealed in the following comment made prior
to the release of the ABM Treaty record to the senators:
[T]he Legal Adviser's reliance on the still-classified negotiating record raises an issue of
principle that is not affected by the actual content of that record .... If the Legal Adviser
continues to rely for his conclusion on an admittedly arguable reading of the negotiating
record, it seems to us that he is under an obligation to make relevant portions public. If that
is impossible because of the requirements of confidentiality in international negotiations,
then interpretation of the Treaty must be based solely on the text and the public record.
Chayes & Chayes, supra note 113, at 1968.
124. G. DuFFY, supra note 59, at 129.
125. R. GARTHOFF, supra note 104, at 7.
126. Id. at 7-8.
127. Id. at 8-9.
128. Id. at 8-9, 18.
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pleted until nearly two years after the broad interpretation was
announced. 129
The Reagan Administration was also criticized for its failure to
consult with the Soviets through the Standing Consultative Commis-
sion ("SCC") or any other diplomatic procedure.1 30 The SCC was set
up to deal with questions of compliance and other ambiguous mat-
ters.13 1 As a deliberative body to which the parties have no express
obligation to consult, its effectiveness has tended to vary with the
changes in the Soviet-American relationship.1 32 It is not surprising
that the SCC was not used to address the reinterpretation issue, but,
under the circumstances, the failure to do so can be viewed as a depar-
ture from what had been accepted practice in the superpower relation-
ship. This failure to use a mechanism designed to preserve the treaty
relationship in the face of disputes is symptomatic of a gradual dissolu-
tion of the bilateral interpretive community.
Some have characterized the ABM reinterpretation as an implicit
abrogation of the Treaty. John Rhinelander described the Adminis-
tration's remarks as, "in effect, a repudiation and abrogation of the
treaty" and Ambassador Smith stated that the reinterpretation would
render the Treaty a "dead letter."' 33 In 1986, Abraham Chayes ar-
gued that "[w]e are going to keep making up ad hoc and increasingly
skimpy legal defenses of particular projects and activities. In the end
the treaty will be destroyed, whether we withdraw from it or not."'1 34
Most tellingly, Marshall Sergei Akhromeyev, Chief of the Soviet Gen-
129. ARMS CONTROL ASS'N, supra note 116, at 68. Generally, according to Raymond
Gartoff, the whole process was not consistent with the established practices of treaty interpreta-
tion. As Garthoff states:
The express language of the treaty was challenged on the basis of the logic of its construc-
tion rather than its intent. Then a reconstruction of the logic of the language was justified
by a reading of parts of the negotiating record. Subsequent practice had not been given
more than a superficial review before the new interpretation was adopted .... Subsequent
efforts have concentrated on justifying a decision already made, and convenient to the ad-
ministration's other purposes (minimizing constraints on the SDI program), rather than on
weighing the evidence.
R. GARTHOFF, supra note 104, at 18.
130. G. DUFFY, supra note 59, at 173-76.
131. Treaty Limiting Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, United States - U.S.S.R,
art. XIII, 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S No. 7503, amended by Protocol of July 3, 1974, 27 U.S.T.
1645, T.I.A.S. No. 8276.
132. See G. DUFFY, supra note 59, at 165-66. For an interesting proposal to create a new,
more effective institutional mechanism to mediate relations between the superpowers on arms
control issues, see Trimble, Beyond Verification: The Next Step in Arms Control, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 885, 897-911 (1989). Trimble argues that if an institution requiring notification and consul-
tation had been in place, the reinterpretation may never have occurred, partly because the "pros-
pect of another legal review ... would itself deter precipitous action." Id. at 911.
133. F. BOYLE, THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
387 (1989).
134. G. DUFFY, supra note 59, at 130.
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eral Staff, called the reinterpretation a "deliberate deceit," insofar as
the United States was thereby really withdrawing from the Treaty. 135
From the perspective of legal interpretive communities, the rein-
terpretation can be branded as a divergence from the conventions, as-
sumptions and practices of arms control and international law experts.
The people levelling the critique are justified in so doing because they
are working within the assumptions and categories of the interpretive
community. Their authority derives from membership in the relevant
community, and their influence hinges on the degree to which each is
recognized as an expert in the field. To the extent that the judgment
represents the dominant view of the interpretive community, it has a
constraining effect. While the critique usually takes the form of stat-
ing explicitly "that reading is wrong," the thrust of the criticism is
that the interpretation represents an implicit abrogation of the treaty.
By insisting on the broad interpretation, those who advance it fail to
engage in the process of intersubjective interpretation which the rela-
tionship entails. They are not functioning as members of the interpre-
tive community whose focal point is the treaty, but instead are acting
as members of the domestic political community. They are getting it
''wrong" in the sense that they have ceased to be interpreters of an
arms control treaty and have become advocates for a new strategic
policy.
V. MULTILATERAL TREATIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL
INSTRUMENTS
A. Introduction
The theory of interpretive communities is not limited to bilateral
135. F. BOYLE, supra note 133, at 388. The idea of implicit abrogation through unconven-
tional interpretation is also captured in the remarks of those who insisted that if the United
States really wanted to pursue SDI it should do so frontally, by withdrawing from the Treaty,
rather than "skirting the issue." Joint Hearings, supra note 105, at 17 (statement of General
Allison). The following exchange between Senator Jesse Helms and Professor Louis Henkin is
also revealing:
Professor Henkin: I should say also, Senator, if we are talking about the security of the
United States, I wonder whether this particular means is the way of addressing our security
concerns; that is by trying to reinterpret the treaty in a way different from the way the
Senate understood it .... [Slince we have a 6-month clause in this particular treaty, we
could give a 6-month notice and get out of the treaty that way.
Senator Helms: Excuse me, sir. Then there would be another select committee on both sides
of the Congress condemning the President, saying that he is a warmonger and all the rest of
it.
Professor Henkin: Perhaps, sir, and so be it.
Id. at 91-92. Professor Henkin's point was that the reinterpretation was being used as a means of
circumventing the Treaty's limits, without taking the politically difficult step of withdrawing
from it.
[Vol. 12:371
Treaty Interpretation
treaty interpretation, although its application is most easily discernible
in that context. Multilateral treaties and constitutional instruments
(like the United Nations Charter) tend to be more open-textured than
bilateral treaties, because they must capture a broader range of inter-
ests, concerns and understandings. The interpretive process tends to
be more evolutionary as shared meanings are worked out over time.
The interpretive community is likely to be less unified and diverging
interpretations more difficult to reconcile through consultation and ne-
gotiation because tampering can unravel the whole fabric.
Nevertheless, to the extent that the relevant interpretive commu-
nity is unified, its conventions guide interpretive activity. The degree
of unity is dependent, in part, on the extent to which the participants
in the enterprise share an interest in preserving the overall relation-
ship. Robert Keohane's distinction between specific and diffuse reci-
procity is instructive:
To expand the range of cooperation in world politics, it may be necessary
to go beyond the practice of specific reciprocity and to engage in diffuse
reciprocity: that is, to contribute one's share, or behave well toward
others, not because of ensuing rewards from specific actors, but in the
interests of continuing satisfactory overall results for the group of which
one is a part, as a whole.1 36
While specific reciprocity depends on partners exchanging items of
equal value, diffuse reciprocity connotes conformity with generally ac-
cepted standards of behavior.1 37
B. Article IV of the NPT
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
("NPT") is at the heart of what many analysts regard as a moderately
effective, if imperfect, security regime. 38 It represents a multilateral
bargain whereby non-nuclear-weapon State-parties agree not to manu-
facture or to acquire nuclear weapons in exchange for commitments
from nuclear States to: i) pursue negotiations toward disarmament;
and, ii) assist in civilian nuclear programs. The two obligations im-
posed on the nuclear States have been the subject of debate throughout
the life of the Treaty. While the former, embodied in article VI, is the
more important of the two, the commitment to assist in peaceful nu-
clear programs provides a more manageable case for analysis of the
136. Keohane, Reciprocity in International Relations, 40 INT'L ORG. 1, 20 (1986).
137. Id. at 4.
138. See, e.g., Nye, Sustaining Non-Proliferation in the 1980s, in NUCLEAR WEAPONS
PROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR RISK 104 (J. Schear ed. 1984).
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operation of interpretive communities because it gave rise to a reason-
ably focused legal debate in the late 1970s.
Article IV of the Treaty bestows an "inalienable right" on all par-
ties to develop research, production and use of peaceful nuclear en-
ergy, and includes an undertaking "to facilitate ... the fullest possible
exchange" of equipment, materials and information for that purpose.
It also requires parties in a position to do so to "cooperate in contrib-
uting alone or together with other States or international organizations
to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy ......
Debate over the nature and scope of the obligation imposed by article
IV came to a head in the late 1970s when the United States adopted
restrictive nuclear export policies perceived by some to be in violation
of the provision. The debate was carried on over a period of years in a
number of fora. The following issue was central: does article IV rep-
resent a promise to facilitate and to guarantee the right to participate
in all types of nuclear cooperation, including the most sensitive, or do
suppliers have discretion to deny access to certain forms of technology
deemed by them to be proliferation-prone?
The history of the debate can be traced to a number of disturbing
events in the mid-1970s, including the detonation of a "peaceful" nu-
clear device by India, which prompted American policy-makers to un-
dertake a series of steps to tighten access to sensitive elements of the
nuclear fuel cycle. In October 1976, President Ford announced a
deferral of plutonium reprocessing until proliferation problems could
be resolved.1 39 The policy was carried forward by the Carter Admin-
istration, culminating in the enactment of the Nuclear Non-Prolifera-
tion Act of 1978 ("NNPA"). The Act legislated an embargo on
enrichment and reprocessing plants and stipulated that new commit-
ments to export significant amounts of separated plutonium and
highly enriched uranium were to be avoided. Prior U.S. consent was
required for the reprocessing, enrichment (over 20%) or alteration of
U.S.-supplied nuclear materials, as well as the retransfer to other
countries of U.S.-supplied spent reactor fuel or fuel used in U.S.-sup-
plied reactors. 140 Most countries did not react favorably to the Ameri-
can policy shift (the stiffest opponents being the Germans and the
139. U.S. policy was motivated by the conviction that plutonium-producing technology
could not be adequately safeguarded. Reprocessed (or separated) plutonium is usable as both a
reactor fuel and directly in nuclear weapons. It poses a special proliferation risk because, unlike
uranium, the plutonium used in bombs is identical to that which is used commercially.
140. STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE NPT: THE MAIN
POLITICAL BARRIER TO NUCLEAR WEAPON PROLIFERATION 27 (1980). For a detailed analysis
of the Act, see Bettauer, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, 10 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 1105 (1978).
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Japanese), charging a violation of the NPT "bargain" and an intrusion
into their nuclear programs.' 4'
The most obvious evidence of the operation of a multilateral inter-
pretive community is the emphasis American officials placed on the
need to build an international consensus in support of U.S. policy.
The President's statement on signing the NNPA in March 1978 read,
in part, as follows:
I am persuaded that the new criteria, incentives, and procedures in this
act ... will help to insure that access to nuclear energy will not be ac-
coml~anied by the spread of nuclear explosive capability. While I recog-
nize that some of these provisions may involve adjustments by our
friends abroad, this more comprehensive policy will greatly increase in-
ternational security. I believe they will ultimately join us in our belief
that improved world security justifies the steps which we all must take to
bring it about. 142
To forge that consensus, considerable effort was made by officials re-
sponsible for presenting the policy to international audiences to recon-
cile it with the dictates of article IV. t 43 Furthermore, much of the
141. Winkler, Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s: Perceptions and Proposals, in NUCLEAR
PROLIFERATION IN THE 1980s 139, 145-46 (W. Kincade & C. Bertram eds. 1982).
142. Carter, Nuclear Policy: Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, 78 DEP'T ST. BULL. 49, 50 (Apr.
1978). Joseph Nye, in testifying before a Senate subcommittee in 1977 on the pending legislation
said:
This strategy places a high degree of emphasis on intensive diplomatic and technical cooper-
ation with other nations .... [T]he central long-term goal of our strategy is to build a broad
consensus on political and technical means to make the commercial nuclear fuel cycle as
proliferation resistant as possible in the face of technological change.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1977: Hearings on S. 897 and S. 1432 Before the Sub-
comm. on Energy Research and Development of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Re-
sources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 170 (1977).
143. In a representative statement, Joseph Nye, Deputy to the Under Secretary for Security
Assistance, offered this legal defense of the decision to defer reprocessing at an IAEA-sponsored
Conference in Salzburg:
I would emphasize categorically that this decision does not mean that the United States has
failed to support article IV of the NPT. On the contrary, we recognize that, as a nuclear-
weapons state, the United States has a special responsibility to share with others the benefits
of nuclear energy. Our policies are aimed at fulfilling this responsibility, while directed
against those activities proscribed in articles I and II of the treaty. But in doing so, we must
not imperil the objectives of articles I and II. When, for such reasons, we decide to deny
ourselves commercialization of reprocessing, it hardly seems required to export it.
Nye, United States Policy on Nuclear Technology. Combining Energy and Security, 76 DEP'T ST.
BULL. 550, 551-52 (May 1977). Implicit in the quote is the idea that the United States deliber-
ately deferred its own reprocessing program to avoid running afoul of article IV of the NPT,
rather than for economic reasons. Some evidence that this was in fact the case can be found in
the Ford/Mitre report, a private study in which the authors concluded that, by deferring pluto-
nium recycling and breeder commercialization, the United States could "preempt charges of
discrimination, of failure to honor NPT commitments." FORD FOUNDATION NUCLEAR EN-
ERGY POLICY STUDY GROUP AND MITRE CORPORATION REPORT, NUCLEAR POWER ISSUES
AND CHOICES 37 (1977). The study is regarded as having had a marked influence on the Carter
administration's policy, given that many people involved in its preparation went on to take up
important posts in the administration, including Joseph Nye, Spurgeon Keeny, Harold Brown
and Albert Carnesale. See M. BRENNER, NUCLEAR POWER AND NON-PROLIFERATION: THE
REMAKING OF U.S. POLICY 118-19 (1981).
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effort at justification revealed an intersubjective approach to interpre-
tation. For example, in a statement before the Senate Subcommittee
on Arms Control, Oceans and International Environment, Robert Fri
expressed his support for the Administration's draft bill in the follow-
ing terms: it "reflects our determination to avoid actions that could be
seen by others as raising questions under article IV of the Nonprolifer-
ation Treaty."'" The statement reveals that the implict interpretation
of the NPT represented by the NNPA was evaluated not according to
objective criteria, but in terms of its acceptability to other countries. 145
Nevertheless, American policy was not well-received by other
NPT parties, partly because the concerns and understandings of the
multilateral interpretive community were not fully addressed in the
American decision-making process. Divisions within the Carter Ad-
ministration between the "purists" and the "pragmatists" meant that
contradictory signals were transmitted abroad. Unlike the
pragmatists, who understood that positive collaboration of foreign
governments within the NPT framework was a condition for building
a proliferation-resistant regime, the purists were more inclined to try
to impose U.S. values on the rest of the world. 146 At various points,
the purists seemed to control the process and statements were issued
that reflected a unilateralist approach.147 Described by Michael Bren-
ner as parochial and "novices in the field of international politics," the
purists were less sensitive to the NPT bargain and the impact that
144. Nuclear Nonproliferation and Export Controls: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Arms
Control, Oceans and International Environment of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1977) (statement of Robert Fri). For a similar comment, see Nuclear Non-
proliferation Act of 1977: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and
Federal Services of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 345 (1977)
(statement of Richard Kennedy, Commissioner of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission).
145. Also noteworthy is the fact that, as Director of Energy Research, Development and
Administration (ERDA), Fri had an institutional stake in the position he espoused. As Michael
Brenner points out, among the several factions within the bureaucracy, those who were most
disposed to promote nuclear exports were located in ERDA. While the agency lost some of its
institutional dominance during the Carter years, it remained "at the center of an international
network of communications among atomic energy agencies, industrial enterprises and research
laboratories." M. BRENNER, supra note 143, at 127-29. ERDA was, in many respects, the do-
mestic institutional mouthpiece of international advocates of liberal nuclear transfers under arti-
cle IV of the NPT.
Charles Van Doren had a similar institutional role as spokesperson for U.S. policy at the
NPT Review Conference in 1980. See 1980 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE TREATY ON NON-
PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, ACDA SPECIAL REPORT (1980) for samples of Van
Doren's statements at the Conference. See also Second Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review
Conference: Implications of Recent Nuclear Developments: Hearing Before Subcomms. on Inter-
national Security and Scientific Affairs and on International Economic Policy and Trade of the
House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 17-18 (1979), for Van Doren's testimony
at hearings prior to the Conference.
146. M. BRENNER, supra note 143, at 125.
147. Nye, supra note 138, at 107.
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restrictive American policies would have on its political influence
within the community of NPT members. 48
Furthermore, the timing of the enactment of the NNPA was not
ideal. It was viewed by many as a unilateral prejudging of the out-
come of the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation ("INFCE"), which
had been instigated by the Carter Administration in 1977 to provide a
two-year period in which nations could re-examine assumptions about
the benefits and risks associated with various aspects of the nuclear
fuel cycle. While asserting that it does not prejudge the objectivity or
outcome of the INFCE, a number of provisions and conditions in the
NNPA concerning reprocessing appear to do just that.' 49
Finally, there is little evidence in the public record of U.S. experts
and officials ever subjecting article IV to systematic legal analysis.' 50
Given the propensity of foreign critics to couch their arguments in
legalistic terms, the failure of the United States to respond in kind is
noteworthy. Germany, in particular, repeatedly justified its own poli-
cies and criticized the American position on the basis of its interpreta-
tion of article IV. In a 1977 symposium in New York, the German
Consul General briefly reviewed the history of the Treaty, explained
that his government "attached great importance to those provisions in
the NPT laid down in the preamble and article IV" and recalled the
following assurance given by the U.S. Ambassador to the United Na-
tions in May 1968:
Any concern is unfounded that this treaty imposed interdictions or limi-
tations to non-nuclear-weapon states concerning the possibility to de-
velop their abilities in the field of nuclear science and technique. This
treaty requires no state to accept the status of technological dependence
or to be excluded from developments of nuclear research. The entire
148. M. BRENNER, supra note 143, at 125.
149. Bettauer, supra note 140, at 1179. See also Kaiser, The Great Nuclear Debate: German-
American Disagreements, 30 FOREIGN POL'Y 83, 105 (1978); Goldschmidt & Kratzer, Peaceful
Nuclear Relations: A Study of the Creation and Erosion of Confidence, in WORLD NUCLEAR
ENERGY 19, 46 (I. Smart ed. 1982).
150. In responding to a question from Senator Glenn at Congressional hearings, one admin-
istration official said "we are working on a number of memoranda and studies.., one of these is
a very specific analysis from the legal people." Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1977: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Federal Services of the Senate Comm.
on Government Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 138 (1977) (statement of Thomas Davies, Assistant
Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency). If such an analysis was done, it did
not figure prominently in the debate, either domestically or internationally. The most extensive
input from Administration legal advisers on the public record is the article written by Ronald
Bettauer, Department of State Assistant Legal Adviser for Nuclear Affairs, after the NNPA was
enacted. See Bettauer, supra note 140. John Palfrey, a legal consultant to the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, testified at hearings, but in a personal rather than official capacity. Nu-
clear Nonproliferation and Export Controls: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Arms Control.
Oceans and International Environment of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 192-99 (1977) (statement of John Palfrey).
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field of nuclear science connected with the production of electricity will
be available, pursuant to the NPT, to all of those who want to use it.
This includes not only the present generation of nuclear reactors but also
the more advanced technology of fast breeder reactors. 15
If the U.S. decision-makers were convinced that their interpretation of
article IV was better, one would have expected more evidence of ef-
forts to reconcile the statements of Ambassador Goldberg with U.S.
policy. Leaving aside the question of whether U.S. policy was sustain-
able under law, it is clear that the legal analysis and argumentation
throughout the policy-making process was inadequate.' 52 The failure
to engage in systematic legal analysis can fairly be branded as a diver-
gence from the accepted practices of the interpretive community asso-
ciated with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Partly because of the legal
criticism from members of that community, the policy had to be
reformed.
This cursory analysis illustrates that interpretation of a provision,
even as imprecise as article IV of the NPT, is subject to the conven-
tions and assumptions of the multilateral interpretive community asso-
ciated with the Treaty. If more direct attention had been paid to
international legal considerations, American policy might have been
executed in a manner more conducive to international acceptance.
53
Furthermore, the United States might have been more successful in
persuading other countries to follow its lead. As it turns out, the
United States was vindicated in its judgment that there was no imme-
diate economic justification for plutonium reprocessing and breeder
commercialization, 5 4 but most European countries and Japan contin-
151. Approaches to the Prevention of Diversion of Nuclear Fuel to Military Uses, 16 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 451, 458 (1977) (statement by Werner Ungerer, German Consul General to the
United States).
152. For a contemporary legal analysis of the nature of the obligation assumed by the parties
to the NPT under article IV, see Greig, The Interpretation of Treaties and Article IV2 of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 6 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 77, 92-93 (1978). For a detailed anal-
ysis of the negotiation records, see M. SHAKER, THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY:
ORIGIN AND IMPLEMENTATION, 1959-1979 (1980). See also M. WILLRICH, NON-PROLIFERA-
TION TREATY: FRAMEWORK FOR NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL (1969).
153. For example, the timing of the NNPA could have been different. President Carter
signed it into law on March 10, 1978, despite continued Administration objections that a section
proscribing new reprocessing violated the common decision of INFCE countries to study the
matter further. Franko, U.S. Regulation of the Spread of Nuclear Technologies Through Supplier
Power: Lever or Boomerang?, 10 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1181, 1199 (1978).
154. Plutonium has proven to be economically unattractive as a nuclear fuel. The global
demand for nuclear energy has continued to decline, partly because electricity demand has
slowed and partly because of safety concerns. Also, new reserves of natural uranium have been
discovered, and the reprocessing of spent fuel has proved to be more costly and difficult than
expected. In addition to the United States, Canada and Sweden have foregone reprocessing and
the development of breeder reactors. A number of European States are going ahead with plans
to separate and recycle plutonium, but the development of breeder reactors is being curtailed.
Even the Japanese, who have the world's most ambitious reactor program, have determined that
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ued with their programs despite American urgings. 15 5 Even some of
the architects of the U.S. policy made the point that, despite the rheto-
ric, a major flaw was its overly unilateralist approach.156 Article IV of
the NPT had generated a set of mutual expectations about acceptable
nuclear policy. To the extent that the United States failed to alter
those expectations on a multilateral basis, its policy fell short of the
hopes entertained for it. Thus, while the interpretive community asso-
ciated with the NPT seems not to have constrained aspects of Ameri-
can non-proliferation policy in the short term, it eventually
contributed to a felt need to shift to a more internationally accepted
approach to nuclear export restraints.
C. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter
Interpreting the United Nations Charter is, at root, a matter of
uncovering shared expectations about international life. Occasionally
the International Court of Justice is called on to interpret the Charter,
but on the whole, its meaning is shaped by the actions and reactions of
States and the opinions of publicists and scholars.1 57 As with bilateral
and multilateral treaties, the authority of an interpretation will turn on
the extent to which the relevant interpretive community is persuaded
by it, and, in order to persuade, the accepted conventions of the enter-
prise must be respected. t5 8 Interpretations must be justified, not on
the basis of self-interest, but "in terms of the 'shared values' expressed
in the Charter or through other consensual procedures."' 59 It is possi-
ble for the meaning of a provision to be clear in the sense that "its
meaning is taken for granted ... a 'given datum,' not subject to ques-
tion at that time." 60 Furthermore, even when the specific provision is
not clear, the "shared values" or "common interests" that guide the
breeders would not become commercially viable until the year 2020. See generally W. SWEET,
THE NUCLEAR AGE: ATOMIC ENERGY, PROLIFERATION AND THE ARMS RACE 47-64 (2d ed.
1988); Walker, Nuclear Trade Relations in the Decade to 1995, in NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERA-
TION: AN AGENDA FOR THE 1990s 64-81 (J. Simpson ed. 1987).
155. Smith & Rathjens, Reassessing Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy, 59 FOREIGN AFF. 875,
882 (1981).
156. See id. at 882; Nye, supra note 138, at 108.
157. Henkin, Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in RIGHT V. MIGHT 37, 40 (1989).
158. As Henkin asserts, "an interpretation that does not accord with text, purpose, design,
history, and other accepted principles of treaty construction will persuade nobody and will serve
no purpose." Id. at 59.
159. Schachter, Interpretation of the Charter in the Political Organs of the United Nations, in
LAW, STATE AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 269, 280 (S. Engel & R. M6tall eds. 1964).
160. Id. at 274-75. In 1964, shortly after the Cuban Missile Crisis, Oscar Schachter identi-
fied the threat of nuclear disaster and the demands for effective recognition of human dignity as
"hard facts" which find their expression in the Charter and more specific norms emanating from
the United Nations. Id. at 281-82.
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interpretive task may be. The "meaning" or "shared values" or "com-
mon interests" embodied in a Charter provision are those attributed to
it by the global interpretive community. They are not immutable, but
as common beliefs widely accepted at a given time they are not seri-
ously questioned within the community of interpretation.
A brief review of the legal events surrounding the Cuban Missile
Crisis illustrates the point. The Soviet placement of offensive nuclear
missiles in Cuba in 1962 set off a crisis that brought the superpowers
to the brink of nuclear war. When the United States acquired certain
evidence of the emplacement on October 14, President Kennedy sum-
moned a group of advisers, later known as the Executive Committee of
the National Security Council ("ExCom"). Three options were con-
sidered seriously: bilateral diplomacy, a naval blockade and direct
military intervention in the form of a surgical airstrike. 161 On October
22, the President announced a "defensive maritime quarantine" to pre-
vent the further introduction of missiles and to induce the Soviets to
withdraw those already in place. 1 62 The announcement of the quaran-
tine was quickly followed by a unanimous resolution of the Organiza-
tion of American States recommending, pursuant to the Rio Treaty,
that members "take all measures ... which they may deem necessary"
to prevent Cuba from continuing to receive missiles which may
threaten the peace and security of the Continent.1 63 The quarantine
took effect on October 24 and, by October 28, the Soviet Union agreed
to discontinue bringing missiles into Cuba and to dismantle and re-
move those that had been installed.
A key legal aspect of the crisis was the American decision not to
invoke article 51 of the United Nations Charter.' 64 Briefly, article 51
permits the use of force in self-defense "if an armed attack occurs,"
161. L. HENKIN, supra note 5, at 285, 287.
162. Id. at 280.
163. See id. at 281 for the text of the resolution.
164. A separate legal issue involved the decision to characterize the quarantine as "enforce-
ment action" through the Organization of American States, pursuant to articles 52 and 53 of the
Charter. The legal advice provided by Leonard Meeker on October 19, 1962, on behalf of the
Department of State Office of the Legal Adviser, was that, while unilateral use of force could not
be justified, the law would support a "defensive quarantine" if authorized by the O.A.S. under
the Rio Treaty. Article 52 of the United Nations Charter permits regional arrangements to deal
with matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, but according to
article 53 any "enforcement action" taken by such arrangements must be authorized by the
Security Council. During the crisis, the Legal Adviser's Office took the position that the quaran-
tine was not an enforcement action because it was recommendatory rather than obligatory.
However, later justifications downplayed the "enforcement action" argument and emphasized
that "authorization" by the Security Council need be neither "prior" nor "express"-inaction
constitutes implicit authorization. See A. CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 60-61 (1974);
Chayes, Law and the Quarantine of Cuba, 41 FOREIGN AFF. 550, 556 (1963); Meeker, Defensive
Quarantine and the Law, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 515, 520-22 (1963).
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but in 1962 it was still a matter of debate whether the article impaired
the customary law "inherent right" of defense short of an armed at-
tack. Abram Chayes, who was State Department Legal Adviser at the
time, states that the looser interpretation of article 51 was not adopted
by American officials partly because it would have set a "bad prece-
dent" weakening the "normative atmosphere" in which States act. 165
Much has been written about the Cuban Missile Crisis, and there is
little doubt that legal issues were discussed and considered at various
points in the American decision-making process. However, some have
concluded that the legal rhetoric was nothing more than a gloss on
decisions that had nothing to do with law. One of the most trenchant
analyses along these lines is provided by William Gerberding, whose
views echo the nihilist challenge to law alluded to in Part I of this
article:
[The] elaborate and often self-defeating defense of the legality of the
blockade points to the central facts about international law in interna-
tional politics, namely, its amorphousness and its irrelevance to impor-
tant political matters. It follows from the expediential character of most
of the governmental pronouncements and even scholarly discourses on
the blockade, from the susceptibility of documents and alleged "norms"
and "principles" to almost any interpretation, and from the absence of
authoritative and legitimate institutions to create, interpret, and enforce
the "law" that it can be and is used in whatever manner governments
choose to use it. It does not have a valid life of its own; it is a mere
instrument, available to political leaders for their own ends, be they good
or evil, peaceful or aggressive.' 66
Gerberding asks whether legal criteria and principles were con-
sciously applied in the decision-making process and, based on his read-
ing of accounts of what happened by those involved, answers with an
emphatic "no.' 167 Considerable evidence to the contrary can be
found, 168 but more importantly, if the interpretive community idea has
any validity, it is not necessary to identify instances of a conscious
165. A. CHAYES, supra note 164, at 65. In the ExCom meeting on October 19, the Deputy
Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach expressed the view that use of force would be justifiable
in self-defence. Id. at 62. A number of scholars also took that position. See, e.g., McDougal,
The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 597, 598-604 (1963).
166. Gerberding, International Law and the Cuban Missile Crisis, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND POLITICAL CRISIS 175, 209 (L. Scheinman & D. Wilkinson eds. 1968).
167. Id. at 200-01.
168. The most obvious decision made for conscious and explicit legal reasons was the deci-
sion to term the blockade a "quarantine." R. GARTHOFF, REFLECTIONS ON THE CUBAN MIS-
SILE CRISIS 49 (2d ed. 1989). The idea of using the term "defensive quarantine" rather than
blockade originated with Leonard Meeker, Deputy Legal Adviser, because it had the advantage
of not implying a characterization of the situation as a "war", the only circumstance in which,
according to traditional U.S. doctrine, a blockade could be instituted. Avoidance of the harsher
term thus contributed to the effort to communicate restraint as well as firmness. A. CHAYES,
supra note 164, at 14 n.33 (1974). See also J. Trojacek, The Influence of International Legal
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application of the law to prove its relevance. Seven of the key people
involved in the ExCom deliberations were lawyers (all but one advised
restraint), and there is reason to believe that most of them were famil-
iar with the legal questions and arguments before the crisis began.1 69
Bureaucratic routine ensured that legal considerations were given a
hearing at various points in the process. 170 To focus solely on whether
legal criteria were applied consciously misses the point that all consid-
erations operate on decision-making "not directly, but mediately,
filtered through the different purposes, perspectives, and susceptibili-
ties of the players in the central game."' 17 1 Few would argue any steps
were taken in order to conform with international law despite better
political judgment. Rather, legal norms, procedures and structures
formed part of the context in which decisions were made, channelling
the crisis towards a peaceful resolution. 172 As Raymond Garthoff
points out, many actions were undertaken on what one might term
" 'inertial guidance'-something moving by its own momentum but no
longer controlled or even remembered."' 173 The impact of law was felt
as much on this "inertial guidance" as an external constraint on that
inertia. In other words, law and the legal interpretive community op-
erated not so much as a constraint on decision-making as within deci-
sion-making.
Regarding the American decision not to invoke article 51 of the
Charter, Chayes states that to have accepted a reading of "armed at-
tack" to include this Soviet conduct would have trivialized the whole
effort at legal justification: it would make the occasion for forceful
response essentially a question for unilateral national decision that
would be not only formally unreviewable, but "not subject to intelli-
gent criticism, either."174 Intelligent criticism is the professional task
Considerations in the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962 (1977) (unpublished manuscript available at
Columbia University School of Law Library).
169. Most had seen either a Justice, State or Defense Department memo on the legal issues
distributed in the months before the crisis. A. CHAYES, supra note 164, at 24.
170. In his important study of the crisis, Allison concludes that many important details of
implementation of the policy followed from organizational routine rather than central choice. G.
ALLISON, supra note 89, at 246. Chayes applies this insight in his analysis of legal factors in the
bureaucratic process. A. CHAYES, supra note 164, at 30-35. For a discussion of the divisions
within Soviet political and bureaucratic circles drawing on recent revelations about the crisis, see
R. GARTHOFF, supra note 168, at 74-81.
171. A. CHAYES, supra note 164, at 30; J. Trojacek, supra note 168, at 41, 47.
172. In a recent account of the role of international law in foreign policy, Daniel Patrick
Moynihan writes, "international law is not a scheme for surrender; it is not a suicide pact. To
the contrary, where relevant, it is a framework for deciding how and when to use force." D.
MOYNIHAN, ON THE LAW OF NATIONS 149 (1990).
173. R. GARTHOFF, supra note 168, at 155.
174. A. CHAYES, supra note 164, at 65.
[Vol. 12:371
Treaty Interpretation
of the interpretive community. Self-defense could have been for-
warded as legal justification, but if accepted in this instance it would
have deviated from the purposes and practices of the interpretive com-
munity as understood by Chayes (who, as Legal Adviser, held a key
position within that community). Whether or not Chayes' under-
standing is "correct" (or whether some other conception of the enter-
prise allowing for this reading may not, in fact, be better), the
important point is that his characterization of the legal dilemma
comes close to an explicit recognition of the authority of interpretive
communities. 17"
Another illuminating feature of the crisis is the supposed
"penchant for legalities" held by the Soviets.1 76 One can speculate
that the perceived illegality of an airstrike tipped the scales in the
favor of a blockade among American decision-makers. By attempting
to remain within the law, the United States was able to lessen the pros-
pects of escalation. If the United States had taken action regarded by
the Soviets (and the rest of the world) as a blatant violation of interna-
tional law, it would have been more difficult for the Soviets to back
down and still save face. 177 The stakes in many conflicts are images of
resolve rather than substantive gains and losses. 178 Governments, es-
pecially of major powers, do not wish to appear constrained by a rival
power.179 Law can have a stabilizing influence in crises because the
exercise of restraint can be signaled as compliance with law rather
than lack of resolve. While States may not wish to appear constrained
by the rival power, appearing to be constrained by law makes a virtue
of necessity.
Thus, as can be seen from this example, international law is a use-
ful instrument for crisis management. Describing it as an instrument
does not undermine its validity because it is not an instrument of a
175. The same can be said about his comment that the relevant question is not whether the
United States was "right" as a matter of law, but "whether there was a professionally serious and
responsible effort to deal with the legal issues." Id. at 49.,
176. Apparently the Executive Committee's request for a review of the legal situation was
stimulated by the remark by Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson, who had just returned from his
posting to the Soviet Union, that the Soviets had a penchant for legalities and would be im-
pressed by a good legal case. Id. at 14.
177. The importance of finding a face-saving way out was recognized by President Kennedy
in drawing the moral of the crisis:
'Above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those con-
frontations which bring an adversary to the choice of either a humiliating defeat or a nuclear
war. To adopt that kind of course in the nuclear age would be evidence only of the bank-
ruptcy of our policy-or of a.collective death-wish for the world.'
G. ALLISON, supra note 89, at 61.
178. R. JERVIS, THE LOGIC OF IMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 20 (2d ed. 1989).
179. Puchala & Hopkins, International Regimes: Lessons from Inductive Analysis, in INTER-
NATIONAL REGIMES, supra note 6, at 61, 88.
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particular State but of the community as a whole. Law is not infinitely
manipulable. It cannot be wielded randomly, as Gerberding suggests,
because if its invocation is to have the desired effect, the proffered in-
terpretation must be credible to intended addressees. After all, if the
relevant interpretive communities do not attach any credibility to a
State's claim that its actions are within the law, the claim would be
meaningless and therefore pointless.
Generally, by taking action for which the best legal case could be
made, it was easier for the United States to persuade other States to
cooperate and to persuade the Soviets to react moderately.180 In light
of interpretive theory, persuasion rather than demonstration is the aim
of the enterprise. Even if the American action was not unanimously
accepted as lawful, at most it was a narrow extension of the law. 181
The interpretive community is not static; incremental shifts in catego-
ries of understanding are possible. As members of the interpretive
community, American decision-makers were, in effect, advocating a
slight shift that could be seen as a necessary evolution from the ac-
cepted conventions and categories of understanding rather than a
sharp break. A sharp break cannot be justified in "legal" terms be-
cause the audience one is attempting to persuade will understand the
arguments as a rejection of the norms of the community. Arguments
for incremental change, on the other hand, build on the conventions
recognized by the interpretive community. The interpretive process,
while embedded in accepted understandings and strategies, allows for
departures as long as they cohere with those understandings and
strategies.
CONCLUSION
Law mediates the relations between States through the activities of
interpretive communities. The strength of the mediating influence
turns on the extent to which the relevant communities are unified.
This article has focused on nuclear relations, where unity flows from
the common interest States have in avoiding nuclear disaster and finds
expression in arms control treaties and UN Charter rules on the use of
force. Now that the Cold War is over and international affairs, in all
probability, will no longer be dominated by superpower conflict, a new
180. L. HENKIN, supra note 5, at 289.
181. Id. at 293. See also Christol & Davis, Maritime Quarantine. The Naval Interdiction of
Offensive Weapons and Associated Matdriel to Cuba 1962, 57 AM. J. INT. L. 525, 527, 531-33
(1963). The official position on article 53 did not convince most governments and legal commen-
tators. Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1640 (1984).
See. e.g., Wright, The Cuban Quarantine, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 546, 558-59 (1963).
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era of collective security and international law may be upon us. Fu-
ture disputes, more than in the recent past, will be disputes over the
meaning of legal texts and legal norms. There will continue to be
much room for argument, but the form the arguments take will be
constrained by the distinctive purposes and practices of the legal enter-
prise. The existence of a legal text or norm is evidence of a commit-
ment to the relationship embodied therein. The relationship
represents, on one level, a set of shared understandings about the
terms of the relationship. But the generalized character of words and
the elusiveness of meaning indicate that the commitment is and must
be something more than an agreement to abide by substantive rules of
behavior. It is also a commitment to a process of constructing the
meaning of the relationship together.
There are, however, limits to the influence of interpretive commu-
nities within the existing international legal system. Many if not most
international legal disputes (like domestic legal disputes) turn on facts
as opposed to law. Yet access to these facts is much more restricted
than access to the legal materials. Thus, while members of a commu-
nity can often be counted on to interpret a legal norm (written or un-
written) in common, such communities rarely exist when it comes to
factual assessments. To the extent that the "facts" of international life
are not self-evident, what actually happened is less important than
what relevant legal authorities think (or say) happened. 8 2 If the rele-
vant authority is the interpretive community, as I have argued, then
the facts that count are those upon which there is consensus among
members of the community. While interpretive communities perform
the task of authoritative interpretation admirably, their capacity to
identify and evaluate relevant facts is much more restricted. The facts
that surface in international disputes do so through an imperfect pro-
cess, dominated by the selective revelations of national governments.
Thus, perhaps the most important lesson for the international legal
system to be learned from this examination of the role of interpretive
communities is the need for new institutions and procedures, not for
authoritative legal interpretation, but for fact-finding and fact-
assessment.
182. In proposing a new methodology for legal analysis which focuses on the reactions of
national decision-makers to international incidents, William Reisman posits a version of this
theme, "what is important in this exercise is not so much what happened as what effective elites
think happened and how they react." W. REISMAN & A. WILLARD, INTERNATIONAL INCI-
DENTS: THE LAW THAT COUNTS IN WORLD POLITICS 21 (1988).
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